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IS KENDRA’S LAW A KEEPER? HOW 
KENDRA’S LAW ERODES FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 
Erin O’Connor* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, New York enacted legislation mandating involuntary 
outpatient commitment for mentally ill individuals with a history 
of noncompliance with treatment who are “unlikely to survive 
safely in the community without supervision.”1 Outlining an 
Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) program that includes 
intensive community-based treatment under the court-ordered 
supervision of a team of mental health professionals, the law, 
commonly known as “Kendra’s Law,” was passed in response to 
the tragic death of Kendra Webdale.2 Ms. Webdale was killed 
when an individual with a long history of mental illness pushed 
her onto the New York City subway tracks in front of an 
oncoming train.3 Her death raised questions about the efficacy of 
                                                          
 * C.S.W.; Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; M.S.S.W., Columbia 
University, 1998; B.A., American University, 1996. The author would like to 
thank her friends, colleagues at The Legal Aid Society – Capital Division, the 
staff of the Journal of Law and Policy and her family for their support and 
encouragement. A special thanks to her husband Brian for his unending love, 
support, patience and cooking and cleaning. 
1 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002). See also infra Part 
I.B (discussing Kendra’s Law and outlining additional eligibility 
requirements). 
2 § 9.60. See also discussion infra Part I.B (describing AOT in detail). 
3 See, e.g., Maggie Haberman et al., Woman, 32, Is Pushed to Her Death 
in Subway Horror, N.Y. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at 4; Bill Sanderson, Horror on 
the Tracks: Woman Killed in Subway Nightmare, Pushed from Platform by 
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the mental health system, and public outrage spurred the law into 
effect.4 
Legislators designed Kendra’s Law to prevent future, similar 
tragedies involving individuals with mental illness who are 
noncompliant with treatment.5 Despite this effort, another woman 
was seriously injured in 2001 when a severely mentally ill 
individual pushed her onto the subway tracks in New York City’s 
Grand Central Station.6 This incident, given the factual 
similarities with Ms. Webdale’s death, naturally and justifiably 
                                                          
Man who had ‘Urge,’ N.Y. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at 2. Ms. Webdale was 
dragged under the train and decapitated. Id. She died instantly. Id. A witness 
reported that Goldstein said afterward, “Take me to the hospital. I’m crazy.” 
K.C. Baker et al., Pushed to Her Death, Straphanger Shoved to Tracks, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 4, 1999, at 3. Goldstein then waited quietly on the platform 
for the police to arrive. Id. He did not resist arrest. Id. 
4 Richard Lezin Jones, Suspect in Subway Attack Has a History of 
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at D1 (recalling incidents of subway 
riders pushed to their deaths by individuals with mental illness, most notably 
the death of Ms. Webdale, which led to Kendra’s Law). 
5 See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer, Speaker Silver Joins Attorney General Spitzer in Calling for Passage 
of Kendra’s Law (May 19, 1999), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/1999/ 
may/may19c_99.html. Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver stated that “the 
specific incident that inspired Kendra’s Law accurately depicts this as a public 
safety issue,” but additionally the bill will assist “the thousand of families who 
have nowhere to turn when a loved one is refusing to participate in medical 
treatment plans.” Id. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer added, “[t]he way things 
stand now, we must wait for a tragedy to take place before we can get the 
mentally ill the help they need.” Id. Kendra’s mother, Patricia Webdale, 
emphatically urged the Legislature to enact Kendra’s Law to “reduc[e] the 
number of potential victims” of the mentally ill. Id. 
6 Jones, supra note 4. On November 15, 2001, Jackson Roman pushed 
Latchmie Ramsamy into the path of an oncoming train at Grand Central 
Station. Id. Ms. Ramsamy lost a foot and suffered other injuries. Id. Mr. 
Roman had been released in October 2001 from a psychiatric hospital after a 
yearlong stay. Id. It is unknown if he was under an AOT order at the time of 
this incident. Id. He was supposed to be in a supervised outpatient mental 
health program, but he had left it without authorization. Id. The directors of 
the program had been looking for him but had not yet contacted the police. Id. 
See also discussion infra Part III.C (examining the effectiveness of Kendra’s 
Law). 
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implicated the effectiveness of Kendra’s Law and New York’s 
AOT program.7 
Although beneficial to many individuals with mental illness, 
New York’s AOT provision extends beyond protecting society 
from dangerous mentally ill individuals to infringing upon the 
rights of those with mental illness who pose no threat. Although 
Kendra’s Law provides legal representation for all individuals at 
hearings, the right to counsel is diminished by other aspects of 
the law.8 By subjecting an individual who refuses treatment to 
serious consequences, including arrest and hospitalization, the 
law infringes on an individual’s right to determine his own course 
of treatment, particularly the right to refuse medication.9 
                                                          
7 See Sean Gardiner, Psychiatric Motive? Subway Suspect Tells Cops He 
Pushed Woman to Get Mental Help, NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 2001, at A7 (stating 
that Mr. Roman told investigators that he pushed Ms. Ramsamy because he 
was desperate for psychiatric help); Patricia Hurtado, History of Convictions, 
Treatment: Subway Suspect Had Been in Jail, Also Spent Time in Mental 
Facilities, NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 2001, at A26 (comparing the history of Mr. 
Roman and Mr. Goldstein and suggesting that, despite Kendra’s Law, 
hospitals discharge dangerous patients without court orders); see also Robert 
Kolker, Diagnosis: Insanity, CITY LIMITS, May 2000 (arguing that the 
mentally ill want to go to jail in order to receive mental health services), http: 
//www.citylimits.org/content/articles/articleView.cfm?articlenumber=824. 
8 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g) (McKinney 2002). See also 
discussion infra Part II.B (discussing how the right to counsel is eroded by the 
limitations placed on the ability of counsel to effectively represent the interest 
of patients). 
 9  § 9.60(n). 
Where in the clinical judgment of a physician, the patient has failed 
or has refused to comply . . . such physician may request the 
director . . . to direct the removal of such patient to an appropriate 
hospital . . . . [I]f such assisted outpatient refuses to take medications 
as required by the court order, . . . such physician may consider such 
refusal or failure when determining whether the assisted outpatient is 
in need of an examination to determine whether . . . hospitalization is 
necessary. Upon the request of such physician, the director . . . may 
direct peace officers . . . or police officers . . . to take into custody 
and transport any such person to the hospital . . . . 
Id. See also discussion infra Part II.C (explaining the right to determine the 
course of one’s own treatment). 
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Moreover, the law abridges the physician-patient privilege by 
allowing treating psychiatrists to testify at AOT hearings.10 
Additionally, studies suggest Kendra’s Law is not only 
ineffective but also counterproductive.11 
This note provides a critical analysis of Kendra’s Law and 
suggests areas for careful scrutiny and possible reform. Part I 
provides a brief history of involuntary treatment of the mentally 
ill through the use of outpatient commitment. Next, it explains 
the development of New York’s AOT law.12 Part II discusses 
both the minimal protections Kendra’s Law provides and the 
various infringements the law imposes on the rights of mentally 
ill people. Specifically it discusses how Kendra’s Law erodes the 
right to counsel, the right to refuse treatment and the right to 
privileged, confidential treatment. Part III discusses the general 
effectiveness of involuntary outpatient commitment and the 
effectiveness of New York’s AOT law. Finally, this note 
concludes that if Kendra’s Law is to survive past 2005, when the 
sunset provision takes effect, the law’s impact on fundamental 
rights as well as its effectiveness need to be considered prior to 
its renewal.13 
I. INVOLUNTARY MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 
Involuntary outpatient commitment refers to the use of court 
orders to compel mentally ill individuals to participate in 
community treatment.14 Involuntary outpatient commitment takes 
                                                          
10 § 9.60(e)(3). “The petition shall be accompanied by an affirmation or 
affidavit of a physician, who shall not be the petitioner, and shall state . . . 
[that] he or she is willing and able to testify at the hearing on the petition . . . 
.” Id. See also discussion infra Part II.D (describing the physician-patient and 
psychotherapist privileges). 
11 See discussion infra Part III (examining the effectiveness of outpatient 
commitment generally and Kendra’s Law in particular). 
12 § 9.60. 
13 § 9.60. Kendra’s Law expires in 2005 if the legislature fails to renew 
it. Id. 
14 Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a 
Lethal Dose to Kendra’s Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401 (2000) (arguing 
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one of three forms: (1) conditional release from inpatient 
hospitalization; (2) outpatient treatment as a less restrictive 
alternative to hospitalization; or (3) preventive commitment.15 
With the passage of Kendra’s Law, New York began to utilize 
the third type—preventive commitment. Although this method 
presents more constitutional issues than the alternatives, Kendra’s 
Law has survived equal protection and due process challenges in 
the lower courts.16 
                                                          
that Kendra’s Law “impermissibly infringes upon an individual’s right to 
liberty, privacy, and freedom from bodily harm” and that it fails to address 
mentally ill individuals’ mental health needs). One criticism of outpatient 
commitment laws is that rehospitalization is often the only sanction available 
when patients refuse to comply with treatment. Ronald L. Wisor, Jr., 
Community Care, Competition, and Coercion: A Legal Perspective on 
Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 165 (1993) 
(arguing that current outpatient commitment statutes are ineffective in reducing 
hospital readmissions); see also Jillane T. Hinds, Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment for the Chronically Mentally Ill, 69 NEB. L. REV. 346, 358 
(1990) (discussing the development of and need for involuntary outpatient 
commitment). The failure of the deinstutionalization movement, a public 
policy initiative developed in the 1960s to transfer less severely mentally ill 
individuals from state psychiatric hospitals to the community, led to the trend 
of involuntary outpatient treatment. Id. Deinstitutionalization’s failure also led 
to a phenomenon known as the “transinstitutionalization” of the mentally ill, 
meaning that the majority of the mentally ill are now housed and treated in 
jails, prisons, and homeless shelters as opposed to being treated by state 
psychiatric hospitals or community mental health programs. Ilissa L. Watnik, 
Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s Law: New York’s Solution 
for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1186 
(2001); see also Kolker, supra note 7 (discussing the revolving door syndrome 
in New York City). 
15 See Geraldine A. McCafferty & Jeanne Dooley, Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment: An Update, 14 MENT. & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 277 
(1990) (providing an in-depth discussion on the three types of outpatient 
commitment and the status of outpatient commitment as of 1990). 
16 See In re Martin, 225 N.Y.L.J. 6, Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Jan. 8, 2001) (holding Kendra’s Law constitutional, as well as finding an 
additional hearing is not required prior to arrest or hospitalization in order to 
satisfy due process); In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) 
(holding that Kendra’s Law does not violate the fundamental right to choose 
the course of one’s own medical treatment under the due process and equal 
protection clauses of state’s constitution); see also infra Part I.B.3 (discussing 
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A. Outpatient Commitment 
The state-imposed treatment of individuals with mental illness 
is justified by the state’s police power to protect its citizens from 
harm and the state’s parens patriae power to protect those who 
cannot help themselves.17 Police power relates to a state’s duty to 
protect its citizens’ health, safety and general welfare.18 
Recognizing that some mentally ill individuals pose a danger to 
themselves or others in society, states justify involuntary 
inpatient commitment through their police powers.19 Parens 
patriae power, however, is derived from the state’s paternalistic 
responsibility to care and protect those that it deems unable to 
care for themselves.20 The different rationales lead to different 
standards for forced medication.21 With regard to the state’s 
police power, the state has the authority to forcibly medicate 
when an individual poses a danger to himself or others.22 The 
state’s parens patriae power, on the other hand, justifies forceful 
administration of medication for individuals that lack the capacity 
                                                          
how Kendra’s Law has withstood constitutional challenges in the lower courts 
thus far); infra Part II (discussing how Kendra’s Law infringes on various 
rights of those with mental illness). 
17 Watnik, supra note 14, at 1187 (concluding that the state’s police 
power and parens patriae power outweigh the patient’s liberty and autonomy 
interests and arguing that Kendra’s Law does not violate substantive and 
procedural due process). See also Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 
1986) (discussing the state’s police and parens patriae powers and involuntary 
treatment and ultimately concluding that involuntarily committed mentally ill 
individuals have a fundamental right to refuse anti-psychotic medication under 
the Due Process clause of the state constitution). Parens patriae literally means 
“parent of the country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1996). 
18 Watnik, supra note 14, at 1187. 
19 See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343. 
20 Watnik, supra note 14, at 1187. 
21 Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 495-96. 
22 Id. at 495. “Where the patient presents a danger to himself or other 
members of society or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct 
within the institution, the State may be warranted, in the exercise of its police 
power, in administering antipsychotic medication over the patient’s objection.” 
Id. 
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to decide for themselves.23 
Conditional release is a type of outpatient commitment that 
requires an individual to follow the hospital’s treatment plan upon 
discharge from involuntary civil commitment.24 Conditional 
release is hospital-oriented and often without judicial 
proceedings.25 When an individual’s condition improves and 
hospitalization is no longer necessary, the hospital may place 
conditions on the discharge prior to the release.26 Under 
conditional release, the hospital or physician generally determines 
the terms of the release.27 If the individual does not comply with 
the terms of the release, the doctor decides whether 
                                                          
23 Id. at 496. 
Therefore, the sine qua non for the state’s use of its parens patriae 
power as justification for the forceful administration of mind-affecting 
drugs is a determination that the individual to whom the drugs are to 
be administered lacks the capacity to decide for himself whether he 
should take the drugs. 
Id. 
24 Hinds, supra note 14, at 356-58; McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, 
at 279. In some jurisdictions, such as Georgia, the court may require 
conditional release as part of the initial involuntary commitment order. Id. at 
279. The dynamics of conditional release vary from state to state. Id. 
25 Hinds, supra note 14, at 358 (comparing the differences between 
conditional release and other forms of outpatient commitment and finding that 
the decision to place an individual on conditional release is solely the 
discretion of the inpatient facility or treating physician). Generally, the 
treatment facility or the treating physician also creates the terms of the release 
and courts are notified after the fact. McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 
279. 
26 McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 279. “Typical conditions 
include periodic reporting [follow-up care]; continuation of medication and 
submission to testing; and restrictions on travel, consumption of liquor or 
drugs, associations with others, and the incurrence of debts and other 
obligations.” Id. The length of time on conditional release varies among the 
states. Id. 
27 Id.; Hinds, supra note 14, at 356. When the hospital or physician, as 
opposed to the court, creates the plan, the hospital or physician can create an 
individualized treatment plan geared towards the best interests of the patient, 
for whom the hospital or physician may have previously provided help. Hinds, 
supra note 14, at 356. 
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rehospitalization is appropriate.28 Most states, including New 
York, authorize conditional release.29 
As a dispositional alternative, outpatient commitment allows a 
court discretion to order outpatient commitment in lieu of 
hospitalization after finding that the standard for involuntary 
inpatient commitment is met.30 Most states authorize outpatient 
                                                          
28 McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 279. 
29 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15 (McKinney 2002). “A patient may 
be conditionally released, rather than discharged, when in the opinion of staff 
familiar with the patient’s case history, the clinical needs of such patient 
warrant this more restrictive placement . . . .” Id. As of 1990, forty-three 
states authorized conditional release. McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 
279 n.41; see also ALA. CODE § 22-52-57 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.795 
(Michie 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.01 (West 2002); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5305 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-
509 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5131 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 394.469 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-85 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 334-75 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 66-338 (Michie 2002); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 1705/15 (West 2002); IND. CODE § 12-26-14-7 (2002); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 229.15(4) (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.181 (Banks-Baldwin 
2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:56(G) (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 34-B, § 3870 (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-806 
(2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 § 4 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 235B.15 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-87 (2002); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 632.385 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-183 (2002); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1046 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 433A.380 (2002); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:49 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15(c) 
(West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-21 (Michie 2002); N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. LAW § 29.15 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-277(a) 
(2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-30 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
5122.20 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 7-101 (West 2002); OR. 
REV. STAT §§ 426.130, 426.126 (2001); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304 
(West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-22-210 (Law Co-op. 2002); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 33-6-202 (2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.061, 
574.082, 574.086 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-637 (2002); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 8007 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-98 (Michie 2002); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.340 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 27-7-2 
(2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.35 (West 2002). Some states refer to 
conditional release as “convalescent status.” See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 
202A.181 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3870 
(West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-21 (Michie 2002). 
30 McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 279-80. 
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treatment as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient 
hospitalization.31 After a finding that the individual meets the 
requirement for civil inpatient commitment, some courts have the 
discretion to opt for outpatient treatment.32 
Preventive commitment is a type of outpatient commitment 
that does not require a finding of dangerousness in order to 
                                                          
31 See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.1 (2001); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.735, 
47.30.755 (Michie 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (West 2002); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-214(c) (Michie 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-
107(6) (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498 (West 2002); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5010(2) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b) (2002); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(6)(b) (West 2002); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(k) 
(Michie 2002); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-812 (West 2002); IND. CODE 
§ 12-26-6-8 (2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.14 (West 2002); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 59-2967 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.081 (Banks-Baldwin 
2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E) (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 330.1468 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 235B.09 (West 2002); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127 
(2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1038 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-
C:45 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11 (Michie 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 25-03.1-21 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (West 2002); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-405 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT § 426.130(1) 
(2001); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4406 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-
8(j) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op. 2002); S.D. Codified 
Laws § 27A-10-9 (Michie 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 
574.012, 574.036 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7617, 7618 (2002); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240 
(West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(o) (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51-20(13) 
(West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110(j) (Michie 2002). New York 
does not authorize this form of outpatient commitment. See N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. LAW § 9.37 (McKinney 2002). In Arizona, once the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that an individual meets the criteria for court-ordered 
treatment, “the court shall order the patient to undergo one of the following: 
1. Treatment in a program of outpatient treatment[;] 2. Treatment in a 
program consisting of combined inpatient and outpatient treatment[; or] 3. 
Inpatient treatment . . . .” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (West 2002). 
Some states authorize the “least restrictive” court-ordered treatment, which is 
included as a form of outpatient treatment as a dispositional alternative. See, 
e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.012, 574.036 (2001); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110(j) (Michie 2002). 
32 McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15, at 279-80. 
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commit involuntarily an individual to treatment.33 As of 1990, 
only three states authorized preventive commitment.34 Preventive 
commitment statutes mandate treatment for individuals who do 
not meet the high standards for inpatient commitment but who 
are likely to face inpatient commitment in the near future if they 
do not receive immediate treatment.35 Preventive commitment is 
an attempt to remedy the problem of “revolving door” patients, 
i.e., patients who, after being released from a hospital, 
subsequently stop taking medications, deteriorate and are 
                                                          
33 Mark Moran, Coercion or Caring?, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 17, 2000) 
(debating whether outpatient commitment benefits the severely mentally ill or 
whether it is a “cop-out” for a failed mental health system), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/hlsa0417.htm. North 
Carolina is considered a pioneer in outpatient preventive commitment because 
it was the first state to enact an involuntary outpatient treatment statute in 
1983. Wisor, Jr., supra note 14. 
34 McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15; see also GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-
3-90, 37-3-1 (Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-127 (1985); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 122C-263 (1989). According to a more recent survey, the following 
ten states allow outpatient commitment without a finding of dangerousness: 
Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi, Montana, New York, North 
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina and Texas. Moran, supra note 33. 
35 § 9.37. Preventive commitment statutes often apply a “grave disability” 
standard, which is a major shift in focus from commitment laws that require a 
standard of current dangerous behavior. M. SUSAN RIDGELY ET AL., RAND 
ORG., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT TREATMENT: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES (2001) 
(providing a comprehensive analysis of state outpatient commitment statutes), 
at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1340/. A grave disability 
standard requires only that an individual is dangerous because of an inability 
to care adequately for himself. Id. at 2. Current dangerousness, which is 
frequently the standard for inpatient hospitalization, requires a finding that an 
individual is overtly dangerous to himself or others. Id. Under North 
Carolina’s statute, for example, an individual is eligible for outpatient 
commitment if, “[b]ased on the respondent’s psychiatric history, the 
respondent is in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or 
deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness . . . .” N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1) (1989). See also Nisha C. Wagle et al., Outpatient 
Civil Commitment Laws: An Overview, 26 MENT. AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY 
L. REP. 179 (2002) (discussing the similarities and differences between the 
New York and North Carolina statutes). 
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rehospitalized.36 It is also a reflection of the state’s parens patriae 
powers and the conflict between medical paternalism and 
individual autonomy.37 Coerced medication compliance is the 
most important factor in preventive commitment.38 Preventive 
commitment, however, has been criticized as simply a “form of 
judicial intimidation [because] [c]ompliance is achieved only if 
the person fears rehospitalization or mistakenly believes that the 
court’s order must be obeyed.”39 As one commentator noted, 
“[p]reventive commitment is a backlash to the gains in mental 
patient autonomy over the past two decades.”40 Another critic 
noted that: 
[T]he courts [now] have the power to decide the essential 
details of many mentally ill people’s lives long after they 
have left the hospital. A judge can now rule on . . . which 
medications a patient must take to whether they spend 
their days learning word processing or taking pottery 
classes. Even such basic decisions as where to live and 
work can now be controlled by the courts.41 
                                                          
36 Wisor, supra note 14, at 159-60 (discussing the “revolving door” 
dilemma and appropriate community responses to stop it). 
37 Id. at 168-69. One commentator has described medical paternalism as 
“the caring parent who nurtures and protects a child without waiting for 
permission.” Mark J. Hauser & Archie Brodsky, Paternalism in Mental 
Health Facilities: Resolving Conflicts over Telephone Access, Mail, and Visits, 
at http://www.psychiatry.com/advocacy/paternalism.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2002). Medical paternalism refers to the notion that doctors can make 
decisions for their patients. Id. 
38 Wisor, supra note 14, at 161, 169. 
39 Id. at 171. 
40 Id. at 166. 
41 Wendy Davis, Insanity Pleas, CITY LIMITS, May 2000 (arguing that 
Kendra’s Law and mental hygiene courts generally have significant power, 
including the power to erode the rights of the mentally ill, especially the right 
to refuse medication), http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/articleView. 
cfm?articlenumber=326. Davis discusses the example of John Sharpe, who 
has a psychotic disorder and history of numerous hospitalizations and, at the 
time Davis wrote her article, was a patient at Kingsboro Psychiatric Hospital. 
Id. Mr. Sharpe told the judge that he refused the medication because of the 
severe side effects, such as twitching. Id. The judge authorized the forcible 
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B. New York’s Response—Kendra’ s Law 
New York’s support of outpatient commitment is a recent 
development.42 Prior to the 1990s, New York was the only state 
with a law that explicitly prohibited outpatient commitment.43 
One purpose of New York’s shift was to close the loophole of 
lack of services to the mentally ill due to the high standard of 
dangerousness required for involuntary inpatient commitment.44 
Without involuntary outpatient treatment, the only mandated 
treatment available, inpatient hospitalization, required a finding 
by two physicians that the individual was currently a danger to 
himself or others, a difficult standard to meet.45 Unlike statutes 
that utilize a grave disability standard, New York’s pilot project 
                                                          
administration of the medication anyway, and Mr. Sharpe was then injected 
with Prolixin, an anti-psychotic that can cause muscle spasms, eye paralysis 
and permanent neurological damage. Id. 
42 Watnik, supra note 14, at 1191. New York does not authorize 
outpatient commitment as an alternative if an individual meets the criteria for 
civil inpatient commitment. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37 (McKinney 
2002). Before Kendra’s Law, New York required a finding of immediate 
danger of serious harm to oneself or others prior to initiating commitment 
proceedings. Id. Involuntary inpatient hospitalization requires a finding that an 
individual “has a mental illness for which immediate inpatient care and 
treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in serious 
harm to himself or herself or others . . . . The need for immediate 
hospitalization shall be confirmed by a staff physician of the hospital prior to 
admission.” Id. If the patient is to be retained involuntarily beyond seventy-
two hours, the certificate of another examining physician concluding that the 
patient is in need of involuntary care and treatment must be filed. Id. If a New 
York court determines that an individual meets the civil inpatient commitment 
criteria, the individual must be hospitalized. Id. See also McCafferty & 
Dooley, supra note 15, at 279 n.70 (listing states which do authorize 
outpatient treatment as an alternative to inpatient hospitalization). 
43 See Gutterman, supra note 14, at 2409; Watnik, supra note 14, at 
1191. 
44 § 9.37. Inpatient hospitalization is only appropriate when two 
physicians find an individual is likely to commit serious harm to himself or 
others if not committed. Id. 
45 See discussion supra note 42 (explaining the requirements of 
involuntary inpatient hospitalization). 
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and Kendra’s Law employ the “likelihood of physical harm to 
self or others” standard.46 This lower standard is easier to meet, 
thus leading to a greater number of individuals eligible for 
involuntary commitment. 
1. Origins of Kendra’s Law: The Bellevue Pilot Project 
In 1994, New York enacted legislation that created an 
outpatient commitment program at Bellevue Hospital in New 
York City—the Bellevue Pilot Project.47 Only those who met nine 
criteria were eligible for involuntary outpatient treatment under 
the project, which was the precursor to Kendra’s Law: 
(i) the patient is eighteen years of age or older; and (ii) 
the patient is suffering from a mental illness; and (iii) the 
patient is incapable of surviving safely in the community 
without supervision, based on a clinical determination; 
and (iv) the patient is hospitalized at [Bellevue] . . . ; and 
(v) the patient has a history of lack of compliance with 
treatment that has necessitated involuntary hospitalization 
at least twice within the last eighteen months; and (vi) the 
                                                          
46 RIDGELY, supra note 35, at 33, 37-38. 
47 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.61 (repealed 1999). Opponents of New 
York’s outpatient commitment statute argued that section 9.61 was a “political 
maneuver intended to appease a frightened and frustrated public.” POLICY 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., FINAL REPORT: RESEARCH STUDY OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT PILOT PROGRAM 16 
(1998) [hereinafter PRA REPORT]. The Legislature enacted section 9.61 after 
a decade-long effort to extend the state’s parens patriae power to include 
“gravely disabled” mentally ill individuals living on the street. Id. The 
majority of these individuals were more dangerous to themselves due to their 
environmental circumstances, but occasionally they became a public nuisance 
and received media attention. Id. For example, Larry Hogue was cited as a 
prime example of the necessity for outpatient commitment. Id. Hogue was “a 
homeless veteran who was both actively psychotic and a crack cocaine addict” 
and who allegedly terrorized the Upper West Side of Manhattan. Id. Neither 
police nor the mental health system were able to help him or the 
neighborhood. Id. Hogue, ironically, would most likely not have been eligible 
for services under the pilot project due to concerns regarding liability for his 
dangerousness. Id. 
O'CONNORFINALMACRO2-26.DOC 4/1/03 2:46 PM 
326 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
patient is, as a result of his or her mental illness, unlikely 
to voluntarily participate in the recommended treatment 
pursuant to the treatment plan; and (vii) in view of the 
patient’s treatment history and current behavior, the 
patient is in need of involuntary outpatient treatment in 
order to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be 
likely to result in serious harm to the patient or others . . . 
; and (viii) it is likely that the patient will benefit from 
involuntary outpatient treatment; and (ix) the involuntary 
treatment program of such hospital is willing and able to 
provide the involuntary outpatient treatment ordered.48 
Interestingly, studies of the Bellevue Pilot Project showed that 
mandatory treatment did not make a significant difference in a 
patient’s recovery.49 Two groups of researchers studied the 
project: Policy Research Associates (PRA) and Bellevue 
Hospital.50 The PRA study assigned individuals randomly to 
either the control group or the experimental court-ordered 
group.51 Researchers interviewed subjects prior to discharge from 
the hospital and in the community at one, five and eleven 
months.52 The key findings of the PRA study are: 
[1.] No statistically significant differences were found 
between the experimental and control groups for acute or 
state rehospitalizations in terms of the proportion 
rehospitalized or the amount of days spent hospitalized in 
the 11-month follow-up. [2.] For both the experimental 
                                                          
48 § 9.61(c). The eligibility criteria did not focus on patients with a 
documented history of violence, the supposed targets of the legislation. PRA 
REPORT, supra note 47, at 47. 
49 PRA REPORT, supra note 47. See also Michael A. Riccardi, Courts 
Make Kendra’s Law Work, N.Y.L.J., May 7, 2001, at 1. 
50 PRA REPORT, supra note 47; HOWARD TELSON ET AL., REPORT OF THE 
BELLEVUE HOSPITAL CENTER OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT PILOT PROGRAM 
(1999), available at http://www.psychlaws.org/MedicalResources. 
51 See TELSON, supra note 50. Those in the control group received 
outpatient treatment as part of their discharge plans. Id. at 12. The study 
consisted of 78 patients under an AOT and 64 control patients. PRA REPORT, 
supra note 47, at i. 
52 PRA REPORT, supra note 47, at i. 
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and control subjects, a statistically significantly smaller 
proportion were rehospitalized during the 11 month 
follow-up in OCP as compared to the year preceding the 
target admission. [3.] Arrests during the follow-up period 
revealed no violence against persons for either group and 
relatively few subjects arrested overall, 16% for controls 
and 18% for experimentals. There were no differences 
between the control and experimental group on indicators 
for any arrest, multiple arrests, number of arrests, or 
most serious charge. [4.] The control and experimental 
groups overall were not significantly different on any 
quality of life or symptomatology outcome measures. [5.] 
There were no significant differences in the number of 
clients in the two groups who discontinued treatment—
27% for the experimental group and 26% for the control 
group.53 
Notably, the researchers found “[t]here is no indication that, 
overall, the court order for outpatient commitment produces 
better outcomes for clients of the community than enhanced 
services alone. However, both groups appeared to profit from the 
enhanced services . . . .”54 
While New York’s legislature was still exploring the issue, 
Kendra Webdale’s death occurred, spurring the state to expedite 
the implementation of outpatient commitment throughout the state 
                                                          
53 PRA REPORT, supra note 47, at ii (references to Tables omitted). “For 
the experimental subjects the proportion went from 87.1% to 51.4% and for 
the controls from 80% to 41.6% with a hospitalization.” Id. at ii. Critics have 
argued that the PRA study has its limitations as well. RIDGELY, supra note 35, 
at 26. For example, providers were unclear as to who was under an AOT 
order and therefore did not consistently enforce the orders. Id. Also, more 
individuals under a court order also suffered from substance abuse as 
compared to the control group (56% and 39% respectively). Id. Critics 
additionally assert that the study suffers from small sample size. Id. PRA 
acknowledges that the pilot project “never reached the fully executed, 
clinicians-working-with-law-enforcement-officers, preventive detention 
version intended by the legislature.” PRA REPORT, supra note 47, at 46. 
54 PRA REPORT, supra note 47, at ii. 
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in only eight months.55 In enacting Kendra’s Law, the legislature 
found: 
there are mentally ill persons who are capable of living in 
the community with the help of family, friends, and 
mental health professionals, but who, without routine care 
and treatment, may relapse and become violent or 
suicidal, or require hospitalization . . . . The legislature 
further finds that some mentally ill persons, because of 
their illness, have great difficulty taking responsibility for 
their own care, and often reject the outpatient treatment 
offered them on a voluntary basis.56 
This legislative finding particularly reflects the state’s assertion 
of its paternalistic parens patriae power.57 
Prior to Kendra’s Law, the real problem was lack of available 
treatment for individuals with mental illness. For example, 
                                                          
55 Jones, supra note 4. In addition to Kendra’s death in January of 1999, 
other similar incidents occurred that same year. See Nisha C. Wagle et al., 
Outpatient Civil Commitment Laws: An Overview, 26 MENT. AND PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 179 (2002). In April 1999 two incidents of violence by 
men with mental illness occurred: a man swung a sword on the Long Island 
Rail Road and a man pushed another man into an oncoming subway train. Id. 
at 179. Tragically, subway pushing is not a new phenomenon since similar 
incidents occurred in prior years. Kirsten Danis, Horror on the Tracks: 
Flashback to Terror of Days Gone By, N.Y. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at 4. In 
February of 1996 a teen with mental illness pushed a young woman to her 
death from a train. See id. In January of 1995, an escaped mental patient 
pushed an elderly woman in front of a train, causing her death. Id. New York 
adopted Kendra’s Law on August 9, 1999. S. 5762-A, 222d Sess. (N.Y. 
1999). Kendra’s Law passed both houses of the legislature by an 
overwhelming majority: 49 to 2 in the Senate and 142 to 4 in the Assembly. 
Jonathan Stanley, Getting Care to Those Most in Need (Jan. 2000) (describing 
the large support for Kendra’s Law by both houses), at http://www.naswnyc. 
org/mhs4.html. 
56 1999 N.Y. Laws 408, § 2. “Effective mechanisms for accomplishing 
these ends include[] the establishment of assisted outpatient treatment . . ..” 
Id. “The legislature further finds that if such court-ordered treatment is to 
achieve its goals, it must be linked to a system of comprehensive care . . . .” 
Id. 
57 See supra Part I.A (discussing the state’s parens patriae power in 
outpatient commitment). 
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Andrew Goldstein, the man who pushed Kendra Webdale in front 
of the train, ironically, would not likely have been subject to an 
AOT order, which is limited to individuals who are noncompliant 
with treatment.58 In fact, Mr. Goldstein had sought commitment 
or supervised living no fewer than thirteen times.59 Each time, he 
was discharged and denied help due to a lack of funding.60 In 
reality, “the contemporary problem [in mental health treatment] 
is obtaining treatment, not refusing its imposition.”61 
The Legislature enacted Kendra’s Law, disregarding the 
significant research findings from the Bellevue Pilot Project 
suggesting that court orders are ineffective.62 Additionally, 
research shows that only a small number of people with severe 
and persistent mental illness are at risk of becoming violent.63 
Kendra’s Law is, therefore, a hasty enactment that is 
unresponsive to the real problem of providing community 
treatment to individuals with mental illness. 
2. Kendra’s Law in a Nutshell 
Kendra’s Law authorizes an AOT program,64 which provides 
case management services or assertive community treatment to an 
individual with mental illness and may include other services 
ordered by the court.65 Case management is a method of 
                                                          
58 Moran, supra note 33; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 
(McKinney 2002). 
59 Gutterman, supra note 14, at 2439. 
60 Id. 
61 Paul F. Stavis, The George Mason University First Annual Forum on 
Mental Illness and the Law, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 7 (Winter 
2000) (describing the history of mental health treatment and changes in law 
and policies). 
62 Moran, supra note 33; RIDGELY, supra note 35. See supra text 
accompanying notes 49-54 (discussing the findings of the researchers who 
studied the Bellevue Pilot Project). 
63  American Psychiatric Association, Fact Sheet: Violence and Mental 
Illness (1998), available at http://www.psych.org/public_info/violence.pdf. 
64 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002). 
65 Moran, supra note 33. Other services that the court may include in an 
AOT order are: 
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coordinating treatment and care in the community. It entails a 
case manager “develop[ing] care plans, arrang[ing] for services 
to be provided, monitor[ing] the care provided, and maintain[ing] 
contact with the individual.”66 Aimed at keeping individuals in 
contact with a variety of services, assertive community treatment 
(“ACT”) is a model of treatment that uses a team approach to 
provide comprehensive, community-based psychiatric treatment, 
rehabilitation, and support.67 
In order to obtain an AOT order in New York, an individual 
authorized by the statute to file a petition must state the facts that 
support the belief that a patient meets all of the criteria.68 
                                                          
medication; periodic blood tests or urinalysis to determine compliance 
with prescribed medications; individual or group therapy; day or 
partial day programming activities; educational and vocational 
training or activities; alcohol or substance abuse treatment and 
counseling and periodic tests for the presence of alcohol or illegal 
drugs for a person with a history of alcohol or substance abuse; 
supervision of living arrangements; and any other services . . . to 
assist the person in living and functioning in the community, or to 
attempt to prevent a relapse or deterioration that may reasonably be 
predicted to result in suicide or the need for hospitalization. 
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(a)(1) (McKinney 2002). 
66 RIDGELY, supra note 35, at 29. 
67 Id. at 28. An ACT team typically includes psychiatrists, nurses, social 
workers, peer advocates, and other professionals working together. Id. 
68 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e) (McKinney 2002). Under Kendra’s 
Law, a petition may be initiated by: 
(i) any person eighteen years of age or older with whom the subject 
of the petition resides; or (ii) the parent, spouse, sibling eighteen 
years of age or older, or child eighteen years of age or older of the 
subject of the petition; or (iii) the director of a hospital in which the 
subject of the petition is hospitalized; or (iv) the director of any 
public or charitable organization, agency or home providing mental 
health services to the subject of the petition in whose institution the 
subject of the petition resides; or (v) a qualified psychiatrist who is 
either supervising the treatment of or treating the subject of the 
petition for a mental illness; or (vi) the director of community 
services, or his or her designee, or the social services official, as 
defined in the social services law, of the city or county in which the 
subject of the petition is present or reasonably believed to be present; 
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Whereas the Bellevue Pilot Project established nine criteria for 
determining the eligibility of a patient,69 under Kendra’s Law a 
patient qualifies for an AOT order if seven criteria are met:70 
(1)[T]he patient is eighteen years of age or older; (2) the 
patient is suffering from a mental illness; (3) the patient is 
unlikely to survive safely in the community without 
supervision, based on a clinical determination; (4) the 
patient has a history of lack of compliance with treatment 
for mental illness that has: (i) at least twice within the last 
thirty-six months been a significant factor in necessitating 
hospitalization . . . or receipt of services in a . . . mental 
health unit of a correctional facility . . . or; (ii) resulted in 
one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward self 
or others or threats of, or attempts at, serious physical 
harm to self or others within the last forty-eight 
months . . . ; and (5) the patient is, as a result of his or 
her mental illness, unlikely to voluntarily participate in 
the recommended treatment; and (6) the patient is in need 
of assisted outpatient treatment in order to prevent a 
relapse or deterioration which would be likely to result in 
serious harm to the patient or others; and (7) it is likely 
that the patient will benefit from assisted outpatient 
treatment.71 
A physician’s affirmation or affidavit must accompany the 
                                                          
or (vii) a parole officer or probation officer assigned to supervise the 
subject of the petition. 
§ 9.60(e)(1). “A petition . . . may be filed in the supreme or county court in 
the county in which the subject . . . is present.” § 9.60(e)(1). In addition to 
each criterion, the petition must state the facts which support the petitioner’s 
belief that the subject meets each criterion and the subject is present within the 
county. § 9.60(e)(2). 
69  See supra text accompanying note 48 (listing the Bellevue Pilot Project 
criteria). 
70  § 9.60(c). 
71 Id. Some of these eligibility requirements, such as (3) and (5), require 
a physician to make predictions, which is not possible in psychiatry or 
psychology. TELSON, supra note 50, at 15. “Many factors influence a patient’s 
clinical course in the community.” Id. at 22. 
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petition.72 At the hearing, the examining physician must then 
testify and provide the court with a proposed written treatment 
plan.73 A court may then order assisted outpatient treatment only 
if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a patient 
meets the criteria, but it must dismiss the petition if any one of 
the criteria is not met.74 
Once ordered, a patient must accept the treatment.75 Failure 
to comply with an AOT order may lead to involuntary hospital 
admission for up to seventy-two hours for observation, care and 
treatment.76 Efforts must first be made to solicit compliance, 
though.77 And, involuntary retention beyond seventy-two hours is 
                                                          
72 § 9.60(e)(3). If the petitioner is the treating physician, the affirmation 
must be from a different physician. Id. “The petition shall be accompanied by 
an affirmation or affidavit of a physician, who shall not be the petitioner . . . 
.” Id. 
73 § 9.60(h)(2). “The court shall not order assisted outpatient treatment 
unless an examining physician . . . testifies in person at the hearing.” Id. “The 
court shall not order assisted outpatient treatment unless an examining 
physician . . . develops and provides to the court a proposed written treatment 
plan.” § 9.60(i)(1). 
74 § 9.60(j). “If after hearing all relevant evidence, the court finds that the 
subject of the petition does not meet the criteria for assisted outpatient 
treatment, the court shall dismiss the petition.” § 9.60(j)(1). If the court “finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that the subject of the petition meets the 
criteria . . . , and there is no appropriate and feasible less restrictive 
alternative,” the court shall authorize AOT. § 9.60(j)(2); see also infra Part 
I.B.4 and accompanying notes (discussing the court’s authority to dismiss the 
petition or order alternatives). 
75 Watnik, supra note 14, at 1199. 
76 § 9.60(n): 
Where in the clinical judgment of a physician, the patient has failed 
or has refused to comply with the treatment ordered by the court, and 
in the physician’s clinical judgment, efforts were made to solicit 
compliance, and, in the clinical judgment of such physician, such 
patient may be in need of involuntary admission to a hospital . . . , or 
for whom immediate observation, care and treatment may be 
necessary . . . such physician may request . . . the removal of such 
patient to an appropriate hospital . . . . 
Id. 
77 Id. 
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permissible only when the individual meets the grounds for 
involuntary civil commitment.78 
Kendra’s Law takes away some of the procedural safeguards 
and protection of rights that were in place under the Bellevue 
Pilot Project.79 These differences effectively increase the number 
of individuals eligible for AOT.80 Additionally, under the pilot 
project, the proposed written treatment plan was part of the 
application.81 Kendra’s Law requires only that the treatment plan 
be submitted before the court can order AOT, which means that 
the individual who is the subject of the petition and his lawyer 
may not learn about the plan before the hearing.82 This change 
                                                          
78 § 9.60(n). Involuntary civil commitment requires a finding by two 
physicians that a person “has a mental illness for which immediate inpatient 
care and treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in 
serious harm to himself or herself or others.” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 
9.37 (McKinney 2002). 
79 Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.61 (repealed 1999) with § 
9.60. One of the differences is in the fourth criteria. Compare § 9.61 with § 
9.60. The pilot project required that a subject be currently hospitalized; under 
Kendra’s Law, the subject may now be in the community. Compare § 9.61 
with § 9.60. The third criteria also changed. Compare § 9.61 with § 9.60. The 
pilot project required a finding that the “patient is incapable of surviving 
safely in the community”; Kendra’s Law lowered the standard to a finding of 
“unlikely to survive safely in the community.” Compare § 9.61 with § 9.60. 
Additionally, the hospitalization “lookback period,” the length of time that the 
court may consider prior acts of noncompliance, increased. Compare § 9.61 
with § 9.60. Under the pilot project, the lookback period was only eighteen 
months; Kendra’s Law extends the period to thirty-six. Compare § 9.61 with § 
9.60. Also Kendra’s Law offers an alternative avenue—not available under the 
pilot project—for a finding of lack of compliance if the subject does not meet 
the hospitalization requirement: violent behavior within the last forty-eight 
months. Compare § 9.61 with § 9.60. Lastly, under the pilot project, only the 
director of a hospital could petition for an AOT order, but Kendra’s Law 
authorizes petitions from a number of different individuals. Compare § 9.61 
with § 9.60; see also Kristina M. Campbell, Note, Blurring the Lines of the 
Danger Zone: The Impact of Kendra’s Law on the Rights of the Nonviolent 
Mentally Ill, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173 (2002) 
(discussing the differences between sections 9.60 and 9.61). 
80 Compare § 9.61 with § 9.60; see also Campbell, supra note 79. 
81 § 9.61(d)(2)(iii). 
82 § 9.60(i ). 
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significantly limits the ability of the individual to contest any 
aspects of the treatment plan. Furthermore, Kendra’s Law 
narrows the time frame for a hearing from five days to three.83 
These changes seriously limit a respondent’s ability to challenge 
an AOT petition, thereby lessening substantive due process 
protections. 
3. Constitutional Challenges to Kendra’s Law 
Thus far, Kendra’s Law has withstood constitutional 
challenges in the lower state courts.84 The first case to challenge 
the constitutionality of the law was In re Urcuyo, in which the 
respondents argued that Kendra’s Law violated both the Due 
Process Clause of the New York Constitution and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the New York and United States 
constitutions.85 Relying on the fact that patients have the capacity 
to participate actively in the treatment plan, the court held that 
the law did not violate a patient’s fundamental constitutional due 
process right to choose the course of his treatment.86 Specifically, 
the court noted that, under Kendra’s Law, “there is no forcible 
                                                          
83 Compare § 9.61(f)(1) with § 9.60(h). 
84 See In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); In re 
Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001). 
85 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). Outpatient mental health 
treatment providers sought declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of 
Kendra’s Law. Id. The court rejected arguments that Kendra’s Law violates an 
individual’s due process rights without a finding that an individual lacks the 
capacity to make a reasoned treatment decision. Id. The court also rejected the 
argument that it violates equal protection because it treats AOT subjects 
differently from individuals subject to guardianship proceedings and 
involuntary inpatients. Id. 
86 Id. The court drew on its own experience in presiding over Kendra’s 
Law hearings in Brooklyn, stating specifically that individuals facing an AOT 
order usually have the capacity to make treatment decisions. Id. The court 
noted “[t]he practical result of requiring a lack of capacity component to be 
added to the statutory scheme would be to eliminate the option of an Assisted 
Outpatient Treatment order for many patients.” Id. at 869. See also discussion 
infra Part II.C (discussing the right to determine one’s own course of 
treatment). 
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administration of medication and the patient will suffer no 
punitive measures for failing to comply.”87 The court further 
explained that failure to comply only leads to heightened scrutiny 
by the physician as to whether or not the patient may be in need 
of inpatient hospitalization.88 The petitions in In re Urcuyo were 
ultimately withdrawn, making it impossible to appeal and obtain 
a higher court ruling on the law.89 
In January 2001, In re Martin again challenged the 
constitutionality of Kendra’s Law.90 In In re Martin, respondents 
argued that due process and equal protection require a finding of 
incapacity before forcing an individual to undergo treatment.91 
The court again concluded that Kendra’s Law was constitutional, 
finding that “the patient is invited to participate in the 
formulation of his treatment plan” and that “no drugs or 
treatment will be forced upon him if he fails to comply with the 
treatment plan.”92 Similar to the court in In re Urcuyo, the court 
                                                          
87 In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 868. 
88 Id. at 869-70. 
89 In re Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 
2001); Fred Cohen, Assisted Outpatient Treatment: Review of New York Case 
Law—And Beyond, 3 CORRECTIONAL MENT. HEALTH REP. 1, (July/Aug. 
2001) (arguing that the expectation is that Martin petition, unlike the Urcuyo 
petition, will remain viable and appealable so long as the petitions are not 
withdrawn), available at http://www.psychlaws.org/generalresources/article 
48.htm. 
90 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001). The 
director of a psychiatric hospital sought an AOT order against respondent 
patient, who opposed it on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Id. The 
court rejected the respondent’s argument that due process and equal protection 
require a finding of incapacity before an AOT petition may be granted. Id. 
The court also denied respondent’s argument that notice and a hearing should 
be required prior to being arrested and detained for alleged failure to comply. 
Id. The court was deferential to the legislature: “[I]t is presumed that the 
Legislature has investigated and found facts necessary to support the 
legislation.” Id. In its conclusion, the court stated, “Kendra’s Law is a 
carefully crafted, well drawn and narrowly tailored enactment specifically 
directed toward the solution of serious problems faced by society and mentally 
ill persons.” Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. The court also concluded that the finding that the individual is 
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in In re Martin reasoned that failure to comply only leads to 
heightened scrutiny from a physician regarding the need for 
hospitalization and that re-confinement is far from automatic.93 
The court also held that Kendra’s Law complied with due process 
requirements even though it does not require a pre-revocation 
hearing prior to arrest or hospitalization because the existence of 
a potential emergency supports the important governmental 
interest of protecting the individual and society.94 
The courts are correct that, on its face, the statute requires 
participation and proscribes forcibly medicating an individual.95 
In practice, however, the application of Kendra’s Law may be 
less protective of an individual’s interests.96 Neither the courts 
nor the legislature have defined the meaning and level of 
participation sufficient to protect due process.97 
4. Judicial Restraint 
Kendra’s Law has also been challenged on non-constitutional 
                                                          
unlikely to participate voluntarily in treatment is “analogous to the finding of 
lack of capacity necessary for the forcible administration of medication.” Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. A review of due process challenges in other states that allow 
revocation of outpatient commitment status and hospitalization of an individual 
suggests that respondents are unlikely to win on this issue if appealed. See, 
e.g., In re K.B., 562 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
statutory procedures that do not include a revocation hearing did not violate 
due process because of the due process protections in the original commitment 
proceeding); In re True, 645 P.2d 891 (Idaho 1982) (holding that due process 
requires prompt written notice and a revocation hearing as soon as reasonably 
possible following the patient’s rehospitalization). But see State v. Bryant, 871 
P.2d 129, 132 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (allowing for a revocation hearing prior to 
hospitalization but finding that due process does not require the state to prove 
that the person remains mentally ill in order to revoke outpatient 
commitment). 
95 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002). 
96 See discussion infra Part II.C (examining how Kendra’s Law erodes the 
right to determine the course of own’s treatment which includes the right to 
refuse medication). 
97 See In re Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31; In re Urcuyo, 714 
N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); § 9.60. 
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grounds. For example, Kendra’s Law severely restricts judicial 
discretion when reviewing petitions.98 Specifically, a court “may 
not order treatment that has not been recommended by the 
examining physician and included in the written treatment 
plan.”99 This judicial restraint limits the judge’s inquiry solely to 
the question of whether an individual meets all of the criteria for 
AOT.100 
In a recent decision, the Appellate Division, First 
Department, found that, when deciding whether to grant an AOT 
petition, a court does not have the authority to decide if a patient 
should be released from a hospital.101 The First Department 
reasoned that the hospital must already have considered releasing 
the patient and have concluded that AOT is a viable alternative to 
hospitalization if it is seeking an AOT order.102 The court clearly 
stated that a patient may not be hospitalized simply because an 
AOT petition was denied.103 
Another court found it had no choice but to approve a 
“woefully inadequate” treatment plan for an individual the court 
                                                          
98 § 9.60(j). Under Kendra’s Law, a court must dismiss the petition if all 
of the criteria are not met. Id. A court, however, is not required to order AOT 
even if all of the criteria are satisfied. Id. 
99 § 9.60(j)(2). 
100 Id. 
101 In re Manhattan Psychiatric Ctr., 728 N.Y.S.2d 37 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001). The psychiatric hospital petitioned for an AOT order against 
respondent in March 2000, but the court held the order “in abeyance subject to 
independent psychiatrist concurring in release.” Id. Counsel for the hospital 
subsequently argued that it may have no legal means to retain the patient until 
the independent examination. Id. The Appellate Division concurred with the 
hospital’s counsel that “while it is within the discretion of the hospital director 
to determine whether to apply for an order, it is for the court to determine 
whether the director’s petition meets the statutory prerequisites . . . .” Id. The 
hospital has already decided that release is appropriate, and “that decision is 
not at issue in the AOT proceeding.” Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. Specifically, the court stated that “[f]or a person residing in the 
community, the alternative to dismissal of a petition because the criteria for 
AOT are not met is not admission to a hospital . . . .” Id. 
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felt should not be released under any circumstances.104 The court 
concluded that it does not appear from the statute, and in light of 
the Appellate Division decision, that “the court can scrutinize the 
plan and require improvements in it. Thus the court must either 
accept or reject this plan.”105 Thus, Kendra’s Law effectively 
shuts down judicial review regarding the wisdom or propriety of 
AOT petitions. 
Although courts may not agree with the strict requirements, 
the Legislature may have desired to keep power out of the 
courts.106 One possible reason for the lack of discretion is that the 
Legislature may believe that doctors and hospitals are in a better 
position to decide when to release a patient and when he is in 
need of AOT. Lack of discretion, furthermore, protects an 
individual from arbitrary decisions regarding the need for an 
AOT order. The legislature, however, should consider allowing 
judges some discretion, or at least allowing judges to suggest 
improvements in the treatment plan, as an alternative. 
                                                          
104 In re Endress, 732 N.Y.S.2d 549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). Barry H. had 
a long history of numerous psychiatric hospitalizations and criminal justice 
contacts due to his schizophrenia. Id. The proposed treatment plan included 
living in a rooming house, supervision during the day, medication and 
supervised employment. Id. Mr. H. explicitly told the court that he was 
unwilling to comply with any long-term outpatient treatment. Id. At the 
hearing, hospital doctors expressed a concern that he was still a danger to 
himself or others. Id. The court did not want to discharge him from the 
hospital but felt it had no alternative. Id.; see also Tom Perrotta, Judge 
Frustrated by Flaws in Kendra’s Law, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 2001, at 1. 
105 In re Endress, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 554. Another Judge, Norman C. Ryp, 
Supreme Court, New York County, who presided over the first jury trial 
appeal, has also spoken out about the lack of judicial discretion under 
Kendra’s Law. Norman C. Ryp, Letter to the Editor, Kendra’s Law Needs 
Review, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 2001, at 2 (calling for legislative review and 
evaluation). 
106 During the pilot project, individuals lodged complaints regarding the 
role of judges. TELSON, supra note 50, at 18. Specifically, complaints arose 
when judges limited testimony that doctors or patients wanted to introduce, 
relying instead on the physician’s affidavit, or when judges failed to review 
the entire treatment plan. Id. 
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II. PROTECTION AND INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS 
Although the Legislature specifically found that Kendra’s 
Law was “compassionate, not punitive, [and] will restore 
patients’ dignity,” certain aspects of the law do not respect a 
patient’s rights to due process, autonomy, liberty and privacy.107 
Specifically, Kendra’s Law infringes on the necessary right to 
counsel, the fundamental right to refuse treatment and privileges 
necessary for confidential treatment. 
A. Protection of Due Process 
Kendra’s Law has a high standard for eligibility.108 One of the 
first reported cases, In re Sullivan, found that the “specificity in 
pleading required under Kendra’s Law is not to be taken 
lightly.”109 In fact, the court held that specificity was necessary to 
protect a respondent’s due process rights, enable a respondent to 
prepare a defense and permit the court to make an informed 
decision regarding the need for AOT.110 The court also found the 
physician’s supplemental affirmation insufficient because it 
“neither state[d] that the allegations [were] based upon the 
                                                          
107 1999 N.Y. Laws 408, § 2. 
108 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002); see also In re 
Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001) 
(discussing procedural due process protections provided for in Kendra’s Law). 
109 710 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (2000). 
110 Id. In this case, the physician submitted an affidavit that made 
conclusory statements rather than citing specific facts. Id. The doctor stated in 
his affirmation, “without any supporting documentation or specification, that 
the respondent ‘has a long history of noncompliance with aftercare followup 
[sic] and medications which has led to physically violent behavior resulting in 
hospitalizations and criminal incarcerations.’” Id. at 856-57. He further states 
that respondent “has a ‘previous history of homelessness that has led to 
incarcerations and hospitalizations for dangerous behavior.’” Id. at 857. Then 
he stated that respondent “has a history of lack of compliance with treatment 
that has resulted in one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward self or 
others . . . .” Id. The court concluded that the language of the doctor’s 
statements suggested that he tailored his statements to satisfy the statutory 
language. Id. 
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personal knowledge of [the doctor] nor identifie[d] the source of 
such information.”111 Heightened specificity ensures procedural 
due process, which in turn ensures that only individuals 
appropriate for AOT will be correctly found eligible.112 One court 
expressed concern, however, that judges, “motivated more by 
protecting the public rather than compelling patients to get 
needed treatment[,] may decide to err on the side of caution.”113 
B. Right to Counsel 
The right to counsel is a fundamental protection against the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty.114 Kendra’s Law 
safeguards this right by providing for representation by Mental 
Hygiene Legal Services (“MHLS”), lawyers who represent 
respondent outpatients at all stages of a proceeding.115 The law, 
however, does not specify when the proceedings begin and, thus, 
when the right to counsel attaches.116 MHLS has argued that the 
                                                          
111 Id. at 857.  
112 Id. 
113 Yael Schacher, Experts Disagree Over the Success of Kendra’s Law, 
N.Y.L.J., June 30, 2000, at 1 (quoting Justice DiBlasi, Westchester County 
Supreme Court). 
114 Watnik, supra note 14. See also Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Services of 
Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (finding a right to counsel for 
parents whose rights are subject to termination in certain circumstances); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding a right to counsel in juvenile delinquent 
proceedings); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (finding a right to 
counsel for an involuntarily committed inpatient at a hearing where the state 
wants to administer antipsychotic medication against the individual’s wishes); 
People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256 (1966) (finding a right to 
counsel for individuals in involuntary commitment proceedings). “[T]here is a 
right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may 
lose his personal freedom.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20. See also Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (outlining three elements to be balanced when 
deciding what due process requires). 
115 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g) (McKinney 2002); see also N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 47.03(c) (McKinney 2002) (describing the functions of 
MHLS with respect to AOT). 
116 § 9.60(g). “The subject of the petition shall have the right to be 
represented by [MHLS], or other counsel . . . at all stages of a proceeding 
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right to counsel begins when the individual is being examined.117 
If the right attaches at the time of the examination, counsel could 
ensure ‘participation’ in the treatment plan.118 Attaching the right 
prior to the filing of the petition, though, is more costly and 
could overwhelm MHLS.119 The courts or the legislature should 
clarify when the right to counsel attaches. 
While providing for legal representation may give the 
appearance that Kendra’s Law protects procedural due process 
rights, the right to counsel under Kendra’s Law is less 
meaningful given some other aspects of the law.120 For example, 
Kendra’s Law requires a court hearing within three days after the 
petition is filed.121 This brief period provides insufficient time for 
MHLS to prepare a case or even meet the client,122 especially 
considering that MHLS often does not receive the petition 
containing the doctor’s findings until the day after filing.123 As a 
result, MHLS attorneys often do not have the opportunity to see 
their clients prior to their hearings.124 Additionally, the law 
allows for the treatment plan to be submitted at the time of the 
                                                          
commenced under this section.” Id.; see also D.J. Jaffe, Report on the New 
York City Bar’s Forum on Kendra’s Law, at http://www.psychlaws.org/ 
StateActivity/NewYork/NYCBarForum.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2002). 
117 Jaffe, supra note 116. 
118 Id. 
119 See Watnik, supra note 14, at 1209. Critics “expressed concern that 
MHLS is underfunded and is often unable to provide attorneys.” Id. “[T]he 
[legal] system could become overburdened as the demand for lawyers 
increases.” Id. at 1218. Wisconsin provides legal counsel once the petition is 
filed. WIS. ST. ANN. § 51.20(3) (West 2002) (assigning legal counsel at the 
time of the filing of the petition). 
120 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g) (McKinney 2002). 
121 § 9.60(h). The requirement that the hearing be held three days after 
the filing of the petition is, on its face, insufficient for any attorney to 
adequately defend a client. The issue is beyond the scope of this note. 
122 Watnik, supra note 14, at 1209. 
123 Jaffe, supra note 116. 
124 Michael A. Riccardi, Courts Make Kendra’s Law Work, N.Y.L.J., 
May 7, 2001, at 1. Judges, however, have been receptive to granting 
extensions. Jaffe, supra note 116. 
O'CONNORFINALMACRO2-26.DOC 4/1/03 2:46 PM 
342 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
hearing.125 This does not provide sufficient time for an attorney to 
rebut the plan.126 Also, the law does not require that the 
defending attorney be notified when a warrant has been issued for 
a client’s alleged failure to comply.127 Attorneys with MHLS 
have thus requested that the court include on the AOT order 
mandatory notification when allegations of noncompliance spark 
the issuance of a warrant.128 Some lower courts have added 
attorney notification provisos to AOT orders, but other judges 
will not add the requirement since the law does not require it.129 
Patients’ lawyers should be notified so they can intervene and 
prepare for a hearing. There would be little detriment to the state 
to include these safeguards in the law. The lack of these 
safeguards in the law makes Kendra’s Law defective in fully 
protecting the right of the mentally ill to effective representation. 
C. Right to Determine the Course of One’s Own Treatment 
New York courts have long recognized that every individual 
“of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body” and, therefore, to determine 
the course of his own medical treatment.130 Kendra’s Law 
                                                          
125 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(i) (McKinney 2002). 
126 Watnik, supra note 14, at 1210. 
127 § 9.60. 
128 Riccardi, supra note 124. 
129 Id. at 1. 
130 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
See, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (finding a trend in law 
and psychiatry to give mentally ill individuals an increasing amount of control 
over their treatment decisions). 
In our system of a free government, where notions of individual 
autonomy and free choice are cherished, it is the individual who must 
have the final say in respect to decisions regarding his medical 
treatment in order to insure that the greatest possible protection is 
accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with 
the furtherance of his own desires. 
Id. at 341; See also In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981) (recognizing the 
right to choose one’s own medical treatment even if the treatment is necessary 
to preserve one’s life); see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) 
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infringes upon this right due to the consequences of failure to 
comply with an AOT order and by coercing a mentally ill 
individual to comply with treatment.131 Although the law clearly 
states that “[f]ailure to comply with an order of assisted 
outpatient treatment shall not be grounds for involuntary civil 
commitment or a finding of contempt of court,”132 Kendra’s Law 
authorizes physicians to “direct the removal of such 
[noncompliant] patient[s] to an appropriate hospital for 
examination to determine” whether hospitalization is necessary.133 
Furthermore, the law allows the physician to direct police 
officers to “take into custody and transport” the noncompliant 
patient.134 These consequences severely impinge upon an 
individual’s right to freely choose the course of his treatment. An 
individual has little choice if the only options are to follow the 
treatment plan or face arrest and hospitalization for failure to 
comply.135 Given that “[t]he right to refuse treatment is perhaps 
the ultimate expression of mental patient autonomy,” this right 
                                                          
(holding that the state must have a compelling interest to justify the deprivation 
of a mentally ill person’s liberty interest). 
131 See § 9.60(n). Failure to comply with an AOT order may lead to 
arrest, hospitalization, or both. Id. Psychiatrists recognize that noncompliance 
is a “complex phenomenon, which may have many causes” with many factors 
to consider. TELSON, supra note 50, at 11. For example, patients frequently 
rejected supported housing because they objected to structure, curfews, and 
other requirements. Id. at 17. Additionally, noncompliance is a clinical 
judgment—some physicians may find noncompliance only if a patient refuses 
all services; other physicians may deem noncompliance to mean a refusal of 
some services; and others may find noncompliance for failure to attend a 
single treatment session. Id. at 14. Additionally, New York’s Mental Hygiene 
Law requires that an individual with mental illness “receive care and treatment 
that is suited to his needs and skillfully, safely, and humanely administered 
with full respect for his dignity and personal integrity.” § 33.03 (emphasis 
added). 
132 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney 2002). 
133 Id. 
134 § 9.60(n). 
135 Moran, supra note 33. “In theory, if a person doesn’t comply with the 
judge’s ruling, that patient can be sent to the inpatient ward.” Id. (quoting 
Harvey Bluestone, M.D., director of the Dept. of Psychiatry at Bronx-
Lebanon Hospital Center in New York). 
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should be better protected.136 
One aspect of the right to refuse treatment, the right to refuse 
medication, is particularly controversial.137 The right to refuse 
medication is well-established in New York courts.138 In Rivers v. 
Katz, the New York Court of Appeals held that the state can 
administer medications over a patient’s objections only where the 
patient presents a danger to himself or others or where the 
individual lacks the capacity to decide for himself.139 The court 
found “the due process clause of the New York State 
Constitution (art. I, § 6) affords involuntarily committed mental 
patients a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic 
medication.”140 Under Rivers, the court must conduct an 
individual assessment of an individual’s incompetency or 
dangerousness before allowing forced medication.141 The Rivers 
court found that “[t]he fact that a mental patient may disagree 
                                                          
136 Wisor, supra note 14, at 162. 
137 See Campbell, supra note 79 (arguing that Kendra’s Law is overbroad 
and unconstitutional, particularly with respect to the right to refuse treatment). 
138 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986). 
139 Id. at 343-44. Rivers, and others similarly situated, were involuntarily 
committed and refused medication. Id. Following administrative review 
procedures, their objections were overruled and they were then medicated. Id. 
140 Id. at 492. Traditional antipsychotic medications, such as Thorazine, 
Mellaril, Prolixin, Stelazine, and Haldol, commonly cause dry mouth, blurred 
vision, constipation, impotence, weight gain and severe neurological adverse 
effects, such as parkinsonism (muscle stiffness and rigidity) and tardive 
dyskinesia (“abnormal, involuntary, irregular” muscle movements). HAROLD 
I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY (8th ed. 1998). 
Dry mouth is a “troubling symptom” for individuals and often leads to 
discontinuation of medications. Id. at 1030. Newer anti-psychotic medications, 
such as Risperdal and Zyprexa, do not cause the debilitating neurologic 
effects, but still cause problematic adverse effects, such as drowsiness, 
dizziness, weight gain, constipation, erectile dysfunction and nausea. Id. at 
1075-77. For a thorough discussion of antipsychotic medications and the right 
of mentally ill patients to refuse these medications, see William M. Brooks, 
Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of Protection for 
Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937 (1998) (providing 
an in-depth discussion of effects of psychotropic medication as well as the 
right to refuse). 
141 495 N.E.2d 337, 344. 
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with the psychiatrist’s judgment about the benefit of medication 
outweighing the cost does not make the patient’s decision 
incompetent.”142 The court understood that “mental illness often 
strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving other areas 
unimpaired, and consequently, that many mentally ill persons 
retain the capacity to function in a competent manner.”143 A 
recent study supports this finding and the holding in Rivers.144 
It should be noted that, when interpreting the right to refuse 
treatment, courts generally treat mentally ill individuals 
differently than medically ill individuals.145 The differential 
approach and response is based on the assumption that mental 
illness impairs an individual’s decision-making capacity and thus 
prevents a mentally ill individual from meeting the requirements 
                                                          
142 Id. at 342 (citation omitted). “For many, a medication refusal is not a 
rejection of all treatment, but a protest against the current dosage or side 
effects . . . .” Wisor, supra note 14, at 172. 
143 Id. at 342. 
144 Id. 
145 William M. Brooks, A Comparison of a Mentally Ill Individual’s Right 
to Refuse Medication under the United States and the New York State 
Constitutions, 8 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that mentally ill individuals 
should have the same right to refuse medication as healthy citizens and 
advocating the Rivers approach, which requires a finding of incompetence 
before administering psychotropic drugs against an individual’s wishes). In 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy as 
a constitutional right. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right to privacy has been 
extended to include the right to refuse medical treatment. In re Quinlan, 355 
A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (finding a right to 
refuse treatment for comatose patient). The Supreme Court concluded in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health that a constitutionally protected 
interest exists in the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 497 U.S. 261 
(1990). As to mental health treatment, the Supreme Court in Washington v. 
Harper recognized a “significant” liberty interest in the right to refuse 
antipsychotic medication under the Fourteenth Amendment. 494 U.S. 210 
(1990). Nevertheless, the court held that treatment with antipsychotic 
medication of a mentally ill prisoner against his will did not violate substantive 
due process when the prisoner was found to be dangerous to himself or others 
and treatment was in prisoner’s medical interest. Id. The broader impact of 
Harper is unclear because it occurred in the context of a prison where the 
state’s interest may be greater. Brooks, supra, at 22-23. 
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of informed consent.146 A recent study shows, however, that 
mentally ill individuals are not always incompetent to make 
rational treatment decisions, despite the fact that impairment in 
decision-making is a symptom of mental illness.147 The study 
concluded that there was a “need for individualized 
determinations of the competency question rather than across-the-
board assumptions that mental illness equates with impaired 
ability to make treatment decisions.”148 This finding echoes the 
New York Court of Appeals holding in Rivers.149 
Interestingly, under the precursor to Kendra’s Law, a court 
could order “involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs” 
only if the court found by “clear and convincing evidence that the 
patient lack[ed] the capacity to make a treatment decision . . . 
and the proposed treatment [wa]s narrowly tailored . . . .”150 The 
                                                          
146 Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal 
and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL.’Y & L. 137 (1996) 
(assessing the legal and public policy implications of involuntary 
hospitalizations and informed consent after the MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study and arguing for a presumption of competence). 
147 Id. at 140. In an attempt to assess different abilities related to 
treatment decision-making, the MacArthur study researchers administered 
three separate tests to six groups of patients and three groups of well persons 
in the community matched on key demographic variables. Id. The tests used 
cannot be directly equated with legal standards relating to competency. Id. 
Although the study found that patients with mental illness as a group more 
often manifested deficits on the measures of understanding, appreciation, and 
reasoning, it also found that “on any given measure of decisional abilities, the 
majority of patients with schizophrenia did not perform more poorly” than 
other groups. Id. A minority of individuals with schizophrenia brought down 
the mean. Id. at 142. Notably, “nearly half of the schizophrenia group and 
76% of the depression group were found to perform in the ‘adequate 
range . . . across all decision-making measures,’ and a significant portion 
performed at or above the mean for persons without mental illness.” Id. at 
144. 
148 Id. 
149 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986). 
150 § 9.61(c)(2). The statute further stated that the proposed treatment 
must “give substantive effect to the patient’s liberty interest in refusing 
medication, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the 
patient’s best interest, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the adverse 
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Legislature deleted this provision from Kendra’s Law and failed 
to include an alternative.151 Under Kendra’s Law, the court may 
order an individual to take a prescribed medication as part of a 
treatment plan.152 
Although Kendra’s Law does not allow the “forcible 
administration of medication,”153 an individual may be “ordered” 
to take prescribed medication with severe consequences if he fails 
to do so.154 The issue is one of semantics—a difference in 
interpretation of “forcible administration” versus “ordered self-
administration.” Practically speaking, the patient has little choice 
in deciding whether to take prescribed medication since 
noncompliance may lead to arrest, involuntary hospitalization, or 
both.155 Even some proponents of preventive commitment admit 
that outpatient commitment statutes are “designed to circumvent 
the rights of competent persons to refuse treatment.”156 
Two lower court decisions have upheld the practice of 
ordering patients to take prescribed medication under Kendra’s 
Law.157 Specifically the courts found Kendra’s Law requires the 
physician creating the treatment plan to provide the subject of the 
                                                          
side effects associated with the treatment and any less intrusive alternative 
treatments.” Id. The legislature, however, did not detail how the medication 
order would work in practice. TELSON, supra note 50, at 19. Alarmingly, 
researchers of the Bellevue Pilot Project found few thorough capacity 
hearings, even though almost two-thirds of the initial orders included 
medication provisions. Id. at 18, 19. Researchers were not aware, however, of 
any incidences of medication being forcibly administered in the community. 
Id. at 19. 
151 § 9.60. 
152 § 9.60(j)(4). 
153 In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 868 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
154 § 9.60(j)(4). “A court may order the patient to self-administer 
psychotropic drugs or accept the administration of such drugs by authorized 
personnel as part of an assisted outpatient treatment program.” Id. 
155 § 9.60(n). “The right to reject the treatment may be more of an empty 
right than an actual one.” Watnik, supra note 14, at 1205. 
156 Wisor, supra note 14, at 170. 
157 In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); In re Martin, 
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001). See also 
discussion supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the holdings of these two cases). 
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petition “an opportunity to actively participate in the development 
of such plan”158 and precludes forcing “drugs or treatment . . . 
upon [an outpatient] if he fails to comply with the treatment 
plan.”159 These findings, however, ignore the fact that the doctor 
creates the treatment plan and the court makes the final decision 
as to the plan.160 Both the physician and the court may even 
disregard the patient’s wishes.161 Ultimately, the cases fail to 
define the parameters of “opportunity to actively participate.”162 
Although this oversight needs to be addressed, even if the patient 
does participate, the court may still order forcible medication 
against his wishes.163 
The lower courts’ interpretations of the right to refuse 
medication under Kendra’s Law do not protect an individual’s 
right to the same extent as the Court of Appeals required in 
Rivers.164 Although the lower courts interpret Kendra’s Law as 
providing an opportunity to participate in treatment planning to 
prevent an individual from being ‘forcibly medicated,’ they 
disregard the fact that an individual has a greater right to refuse 
                                                          
158 714 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (quoting § 9.60(i)(1)). 
159 In re Martin, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31. 
160 See generally In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862; In re Martin, 
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31. 
161 § 9.60(c)(8). “[A]ny directions included in [a health care] proxy shall 
be taken into account by the court in determining the written treatment plan.” 
Id. “Nothing herein shall preclude a person with a health care proxy from 
being subject to a petition . . . .” § 9.60(d). A health care proxy is a document 
that authorizes the power of another individual to make health care decisions 
for or states the preferred treatment of an incompetent or incapacitated 
individual. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 2980(8) (McKinney 2002). 
162 In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); In re Martin, 
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 31. 
163 Hinds, supra note 14. “If forcible medication [i.e., an enforceable 
court order requiring a patient to medicate himself] is permitted during 
outpatient treatment, with fewer patient safeguards than are required for 
[forcible medication, i.e., physically-forced administration of medication to an 
unwilling patient, during] inpatient treatment . . . , outpatient commitment 
loses much of its attractiveness as a less restrictive alternative to inpatient 
hospitalization.” Id. at 371. 
164 Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986). 
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medication when involuntarily hospitalized under Rivers.165 
Medication orders should not be part of an AOT order. If the 
legislature and the courts continue to allow medication orders as 
part of AOT orders, they should require a finding of 
dangerousness or incapacity before allowing a medication order 
to protect an individual’s right to refuse medication, thus 
following Rivers.166 
D. Physician-Patient and Psychotherapist Privileges 
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
confidentiality in mental health treatment, finding that effective 
therapy “depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in 
which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete 
disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. The mere 
possibility of disclosure may impede the development of the 
confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.”167 
Recognizing the significant public policy interests in protecting 
the psychotherapist privilege, the Supreme Court stated that the 
privilege “serves the public interest by facilitating the provision 
of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a 
mental or emotional problem. The mental health of our citizenry, 
no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent 
                                                          
165 495 N.E.2d 337, 344; see also supra text accompanying notes 145-48 
(discussing the ability of the mentally ill to make medication decisions). 
166 Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 344; see, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 
2002) (requiring a finding of dangerousness or incompetency before allowing 
medication to be part of an outpatient commitment order). 
167 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996). In Jaffee, an administrator 
of Ricky Allen’s estate brought a federal civil suit against Mary Lu Redmond, 
a police officer, who had shot and killed Allen. Id. at 1. The court ordered a 
social worker to give the administrator her notes from counseling sessions 
with Redmond after the shooting. Id. Neither the social worker nor Redmond 
complied. Id. The jury found for the plaintiff after being instructed that it 
could “presume that the notes would have been unfavorable to respondents.” 
Id. The Supreme Court ultimately held that rule 501 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence compels recognition of the psychotherapist privilege; therefore, the 
privileged notes were protected from compelled disclosure. Id.; see also FED. 
R. EVID. 501. 
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importance.”168 Other reasons for the privilege of confidentiality 
include reducing the stigma and discrimination that attaches with 
certain mental illnesses, fostering trust in the therapeutic 
relationship and ensuring privacy.169 
The majority of states have adopted the psychotherapist-
patient privilege as well as the physician-patient privilege, which 
developed in the early nineteenth century.170 Although no 
privilege exists in federal common law, federal courts recognize 
state privilege laws if applicable to the proceedings.171 In the civil 
                                                          
168 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2. 
169 See U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL 8 (1999), at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ 
mentalhealth/home.html; see also THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH 
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 4 annots. (Am. 
Psychiatric Assoc. 2001), available at http://www.psych.org/apa_members/ 
medicalethics2001_42001.cfm. 
1. Psychiatric records, including even the identification of a person as 
a patient, must be protected with extreme care. Confidentiality is 
essential to psychiatric treatment. This is based in part on the special 
nature of psychiatric therapy as well as on the traditional ethical 
relationship between physician and patient . . . . 5. Ethically, the 
psychiatrist may disclose only that information which is relevant to a 
given situation. He/she should avoid offering speculation as fact. 
Id. 
170 Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 1530 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications] (discussing in-
depth the medical and counseling privileges, their history and recent changes). 
States originally created the privilege to foster public health by encouraging 
people to seek medical treatment. Id. at 1532. Later, legislatures justified the 
privilege to encourage patients to fully disclose all necessary information for 
treatment. Id. at 1532-33. Beginning in the 1950s, when psychology and 
psychotherapy gained legitimacy, legislatures extended the privilege to include 
counselors, such as psychologists, social workers, school guidance counselors 
and family therapists. Id. at 1540. 
171 FED. R. EVID. 501. Privileges “shall be governed by principles of the 
common law . . . in the light of reason and experience.” Id. When state law 
applies, privileges “shall be determined in accordance with State law.” Id. 
See, e.g., Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2 (recognizing the state psychotherapist-patient 
privilege in a federal civil action). “That it is appropriate for the federal courts 
to recognize a psychotherapist privilege is confirmed by the fact that all 50 
states and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of the 
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commitment context, though, the general view is that the 
physician-patient privilege is not applicable because it would 
undermine the purpose of the hearings.172 Some jurisdictions, 
however, have retained the right to raise the privilege.173 
New York adopted the physician-patient privilege “on the 
belief that fear of embarrassment or disgrace flowing from 
disclosure of communications made to a physician would deter 
people from seeking medical help and securing adequate 
diagnosis and treatment.”174 New York, which in 1828 became 
the first state to adopt the common law physician-patient 
privilege, has a long history of upholding the privilege.175 New 
                                                          
privilege . . . .” Id. 
172 See, e.g., In re T.C.F., 400 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1987) (holding the 
privilege inapplicable in a commitment proceeding after finding a waiver by 
respondent who introduced portions of his doctor’s records at the hearing); In 
re Farrow, 255 S.E.2d 777 (N.C. App. 1979) (holding the privilege 
inapplicable in a commitment proceeding); see also 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally 
Impaired Persons § 55 (1996) (providing an overview of the privilege and its 
application in commitment proceedings). Some states argue that privilege is 
inapplicable because it would undermine the purpose of commitment, because 
individuals raise their mental status as a defense, and because a physician’s 
affidavit is not testimony. Id. 
173 See, e.g., In re Kathleen M., 493 A.2d 472 (N.H. 1985) (holding that 
the privilege applies in commitment proceedings, but the privilege may be 
overcome for compelling reasons); C.V. v. State, 616 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1987) (holding that trial court erred in admitting treating psychiatrist’s 
testimony in commitment proceeding); see also 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally 
Impaired Persons § 55 (1996) (arguing that privilege should be retained 
particularly when an individual voluntarily commits himself to a hospital or 
when a physician is a “treating” doctor). Some jurisdictions retain the 
privilege but make narrow exceptions in cases where it would be unreasonably 
difficult to obtain an evaluation by another physician or where the treating 
doctor is the only source available to testify. Id. 
174 Williams v. Roosevelt Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 94, 96 (N.Y. 1985); see 
also RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (11th ed. 
1995) (discussing the history of the privilege and its application, particularly in 
New York). 
175 Amin v. Rose F., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 2000, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
6, 2000); Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126 (N.Y. 1989). In 1835, the 
Court for the Correction of Errors recognized that the physician-patient 
privilege barred a treating physician from testifying in a divorce proceeding. 
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York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules 4504(a) states that 
“[u]nless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to 
practice medicine . . . shall not be allowed to disclose any 
information which he acquired in attending a patient in a 
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to 
act in that capacity.”176 New York has codified separate 
privileges to cover therapeutic relationships with registered 
psychologists and certified social workers, who are often mental 
health treatment providers.177 
Limited exceptions to the physician-patient privilege exist for 
specific purposes. The CPLR, for example, sets out two 
exceptions to the privilege: 1) “[a] dentist shall be required to 
disclose information necessary for identification of a patient;” 
and 2) specified medical personnel “shall be required to disclose 
information indicating that a patient” under sixteen years old 
“has been the victim of a crime.”178 The Legislature has also 
limited the privilege in other statutes.179 Additionally, in Article 
81 guardianship proceedings, the legislature made a specific 
exception to the privilege—the court may authorize the court 
                                                          
Johnson v. Johnson, Lock. Rev. Cas. 141 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); see also 
Reinhan v. Dennin, 9 N.E. 320 (N.Y. 1886) (applying the privilege in 
testamentary cases). 
176 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2002). 
177 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4507, 4508 (McKinney 2002). 
178 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504(b) (McKinney 2002). 
179 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney 2002) (stating that 
no privilege exists in proceedings for child abuse or neglect); N.Y. SOC. 
SERV. LAW §§ 413, 415 (McKinney 2002) (stating that no privilege exists in 
cases of suspected abuse or neglect); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2101(1) 
(McKinney 2002) (stating that no privilege exists in cases of communicable 
diseases for public health reasons); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3373 
(McKinney 2002) (stating that no privilege exists in cases of narcotic 
addictions); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 2002) (stating that no 
privilege exists in cases of firearm or deadly knife wounds for penal reasons); 
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13 (McKinney 2002) (stating that no privilege 
exists for psychiatric records to enumerated individuals or agencies for 
specific purposes); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(c)(1) (McKinney 2002) 
(stating that no privilege exists in cases of court orders where the interests of 
justice significantly outweigh the need for confidentiality). 
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evaluator to inspect medical, psychological and psychiatric 
records “notwithstanding the physician-patient privilege.”180 In 
addition, courts have also recognized implied waivers of the 
privilege in certain circumstances.181 The express “exceptions to 
the privilege make clear the legislative concept that exceptions to 
the statutorily enacted physician-patient privilege are for the 
Legislature to declare.”182 
New York courts have differed in determining whether the 
statutory physician-patient privilege should bar treating 
physicians from testifying in involuntary hospitalization 
commitment proceedings. New York’s lower courts have 
concluded that the privilege does not apply in commitment 
proceedings.183 The Appellate Division, Third Department, 
however, concluded that it was error to allow a patient’s personal 
physician to testify in civil commitment proceedings.184 
In enacting Kendra’s Law, the Legislature did not include an 
exception to the privilege.185 The Legislature could easily have 
provided an alternative by simply requiring an evaluation by a 
court-ordered doctor as opposed to relying on an evaluation by 
the treating physician. The Legislature did find that “[e]ffective 
mechanisms for accomplishing [the goals of Kendra’s Law] 
                                                          
180 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(d) (McKinney 2002). Similarly, the 
Legislature made a specific exception to the physician-patient privilege in 
certain guardianship and custody proceedings. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW 384-
b(3)(h) (McKinney 2002). 
181 In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). Implied 
waivers occur when a party affirmatively places his condition in controversy, 
such as when a defendant pleads insanity in a criminal case. See N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2002). 
182 In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 450 N.E.2d 678, 
679 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that public interest in homicide case is not sufficient 
to override statutory physician-patient privilege). 
183 In re Benson, 16 N.Y.S. 111 (N.Y. County Ct. 1891); In re Allen, 
204 N.Y.S.2d 876 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). But see In re Barbara W., 537 
N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that the privilege, as to 
communications made prior to admission, is not waived when an involuntarily 
admitted inpatient challenges a retention hearing). 
184 In re Gates, 170 A.D. 921 (1915). 
185 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2002). 
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include . . . the improved dissemination of information between 
and among mental health providers and general hospital 
emergency rooms.”186 To meet this goal, the Legislature 
amended the confidentiality provision of the Mental Hygiene 
Law, but the change does not appear to have had any significant 
impact.187 
Despite New York’s long-standing reverence for the 
physician-patient privilege, Kendra’s Law infringes upon the 
right of the mentally ill to a confidential relationship with their 
physicians by permitting their treating physicians to testify at 
their court hearings.188 Patients and their advocates have argued 
that the physician-patient privilege should bar the treating 
physician from testifying.189 Given New York’s history regarding 
the privilege, courts should not conclude that the Legislature 
desired an implied waiver in Kendra’s Law.190 
The lower courts, however, have determined that the 
privilege does not apply to AOT hearings.191 In Amin v. Rose F., 
the court concluded that there is an implied waiver of the 
privilege, finding that the Legislature “intended and desired” the 
treating psychiatrist to be “intimately involved.”192 The court 
                                                          
186 1999 N.Y. Laws 408, § 2. 
187 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(d) (McKinney 2002) (allowing 
patient clinical information to be exchanged between and among licensed 
mental health facilities and hospital emergency rooms throughout the state). 
Surprisingly, there have been no challenges to the amended law. 
188 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(h)(2) (McKinney 2002). “The court 
shall not order assisted outpatient treatment unless an examining physician . . . 
testifies in person at the hearing.” Id. The testifying physician must state “the 
facts which support the allegation that the subject meets each of the criteria for 
assisted outpatient treatment, and the treatment is the least restrictive 
alternative, the recommended assisted outpatient treatment, and the rationale 
for the recommended assisted outpatient treatment.” § 9.60(h)(4). 
189 See Amin v. Rose F., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 2000, at 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Dec. 6, 2000); In re Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
190 See supra note 181 (discussing implied waivers). 
191 See Amin v. Rose F., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 2000, at 31; In re Sullivan, 
710 N.Y.S.2d 804. 
192 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 2000, at 31. Rather than upholding the sanctity of 
the privilege and its tradition, the court viewed the privilege negatively, 
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held that the Legislature must have intended to waive the 
privilege in Kendra’s Law.193 The court also analogized the AOT 
hearing to a retention hearing, where physicians are allowed to 
testify, to justify the waiver.194 
In In re Sullivan, however, the court reached a different 
conclusion, limiting the testimony of a treating physician.195 The 
court in In re Sullivan found that “[t]he protection of the 
physician-patient privilege extends only to communications and 
not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning 
that fact is an entirely different thing.”196 What information a 
physician may reveal is unclear due to the complexity of 
distinguishing “facts” from “communications.” The privilege 
under C.P.L.R. 4504 covers not only “communications” but also 
“any information . . . acquired” in attending a patient.197 The 
court in In re Sullivan evaded the serious questions of privilege 
and confidentiality because the respondent failed to specify what 
information should be characterized as protected by the 
privilege.198 Furthermore, the court held that the patient had the 
                                                          
finding that it is used as a “tactical maneuver . . . to suppress facts that are 
injurious to the legal position of the person who seeks its protection.” Id. 
193 Id. Furthermore, the court concluded, “[O]nce the privilege is waived, 
it is waived for all purposes.” Id. 
194 Id. See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31 (McKinney 2002) 
(explaining the rules in a situation where a psychiatric inpatient is seeking 
release, yet the hospital is seeking involuntary retention); In re Barbara W., 
537 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that the privilege, as to 
communications made prior to admission, is not waived when an involuntarily 
admitted inpatient challenges a retention hearing). In a retention hearing, “any 
physician-patient privilege . . . which [the patient] has does not extend to 
communications with the physicians responsible for her involuntary 
admission . . . .” Id. 
195 710 N.Y.S.2d 804, 805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
196 Id. 
197 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2002); see also Michael Martin, The 
Patient’s Privilege of Confidential Communication, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1997, 
at 3. 
198 Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06. See also Cohen, supra note 89 
(providing a brief overview of In re Sullivan and other early cases that 
challenge Kendra’s Law). “[T]he privilege question remains clouded and 
undecided.” Id. at 4. 
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burden of showing that the circumstances justified invoking the 
privilege.199 Given the court’s ambiguous statement regarding 
“facts” and “communications,” it is unclear what information a 
physician may provide when testifying and what information 
remains privileged.200 
Similarly, Kendra’s Law creates confidentiality concerns for 
community mental health providers—the treating psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social workers, physicians and case managers—
regarding reporting noncompliance to the AOT case manager.201 
According to a recent report on mental health by the Surgeon 
General, confidentiality is a core ethical principle for all mental 
health professionals.202 The New York state chapter of the 
National Association of Social Workers warned that Kendra’s 
Law violated social worker-client confidentiality, undermined the 
treatment plan and prevented effective treatment by imposing 
mandatory treatment, violating civil liberties.203 Involuntary 
outpatient treatment providers have expressed concern with the 
required “police” role, which conflicts with the therapeutic 
role.204 If the provider must report noncompliance, a patient may 
not be honest with his provider out of fear of repercussions.205 
                                                          
199 Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 805. 
200 Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 805. 
201 Lawrence K.W. Berg, Ph.D., Esq., Presentation Before the Coalition 
of Voluntary Mental Health Agencies, Inc., Assisted Out-Patient Treatment: 
(Kendra’s Law) Implications for Community Mental Health Providers’ 
Responsibilities & Liabilities (n.d.) (on file with the author). 
202 U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 169, at ch. 7. 
203 Harvey Rosenthal, A Misguided Alternative to Fixing Our Mental 
Health System (Jan. 2000) (arguing that involuntary outpatient commitment, 
and Kendra’s Law in particular, are “false solutions and misguided public 
policies borne out of fear and frustration with failure” of the mental health 
system), at http://www.naswnyc.org/mhs5.html. 
204 McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15. New York’s civil practice rule 
4504, which requires certain medical professionals to disclose certain patient 
information relating to a crime, governs treatment providers as well since it 
refers to any and all “person[s] authorized to practice medicine . . . attending 
a patient in a professional capacity.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2002). 
205 See Privileged Communications, supra note 170 (stating that some 
individuals forego treatment to avoid the risk of stigma that follows from 
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Dishonesty will not benefit a patient’s treatment.206 Clients may 
fear the repercussion of hospitalization if they inform their 
treatment provider that they did not take their medicine or 
otherwise comply.207 “The preservation of confidentiality of 
communications between therapist and patient may be a crucial 
factor in the successful treatment of psychiatric problems.”208 
Some patients might forego treatment entirely rather than risk 
disclosure.209 
To continue to protect the privilege, then, the treating 
physician should not be the examining physician. The treating 
physician should also not provide an affidavit or testimony 
containing confidential information.210 The Legislature should 
consider adding a provision to the statute that requires an 
independent examiner.211 Although an independent examiner is 
more costly in terms of time and money, an independent 
                                                          
public disclosure). Because information divulged to a therapist is so personal 
and because of the social stigma attached to those seeking mental health 
counseling, individuals might hesitate to seek treatment or disclose information 
if any possibility of subsequent disclosure exists. Id. at 1543. For example, 
when New York required doctors to report to the government the names of 
those prescribed narcotics, some individuals discontinued use of the 
medications or obtained them in other states. Id. at 1543. 
206 U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 169. The Surgeon General’s 
report noted that a 1995 study found that “as persons perceived themselves at 
risk for serious sociolegal consequences, being informed that certain 
disclosures would result in mandatory reporting, did limit self-disclosing.” Id. 
207 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney’s 2002) 
(discussing the implications of failure to comply with an AOT order). 
208 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 55 (1996). 
209 See supra note 205 (discussing why patients might sacrifice treatment 
altogether without assurances of confidentiality). Interestingly, proposed AOT 
bills required community providers to report AOT noncompliance and 
provided reporting providers with immunity from civil liability; the provision 
was deleted from Kendra’s Law. Berg, supra note 201, at 11. 
210 Cohen, supra note 89. 
211 See Privileged Communications, supra note 170. To preserve the 
privilege, “when an important issue at trial requires information regarding an 
individual’s physical or emotional condition, that information should be 
obtained through a court-ordered examination whenever possible.” Id. 
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examiner could provide important protection to the privilege.212 
Lastly, the Legislature should consider adding a provision that 
clearly protects the privilege between treatment providers and 
their patients to ensure patients provide full disclosure. 
III. EFFECTIVENESS 
Although forty states, not including New York, and the 
District of Columbia currently have outpatient commitment laws 
of various forms, twenty-three states rarely use them to order 
treatment.213 Studies on outpatient commitment and the Bellevue 
Pilot Project have had inconclusive findings.214 Although 
Kendra’s Law has not been fully studied, statistics regarding 
Kendra’s Law provide some insight into the law’s 
effectiveness.215 
A. Research and Statistics on Outpatient Commitment 
Researchers have not found conclusive evidence that 
                                                          
212 Id. 
213 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Health Policy Tracking 
Service: Fact Sheet: Outpatient Civil Commitment (July 14, 1999), at http:// 
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/hpts.commit.htm. The researchers surveyed 
the states’ use of outpatient commitment by self-report. Id. Six states reported 
very common use; seven states reported common use; three states reported 
occasional use; fourteen states reported rare use; and nine states reported very 
rare use. Id. See also RIDGELY, supra note 35, at 15. 
214 See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the findings of the Bellevue 
Pilot Project studies); see also RIDGELY, supra note 35 (analyzing the 
empirical evidence of various state studies on the effectiveness of involuntary 
outpatient treatment). No studies exist on the cost-effectiveness of involuntary 
outpatient treatment. RIDGELY, supra note 35. 
215 N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, STATUS REPORTS FOR 
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT (2001) [hereinafter STATUS REPORTS], at 
http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/Kendra_web/kstatus_rpts/statewide.htm. 
Every month the New York State Office of Mental Health updates the 
information on the website to reflect current data. Id.; see also discussion 
infra Part III.B (providing statistics and analysis of the effectiveness of 
Kendra’s Law). 
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treatment is as effective when forced by court order as opposed 
to non-mandated treatment.216 Advocates for the mentally ill 
assert that individuals who might otherwise voluntarily participate 
in treatment avoid such services out of fear of the possibility of 
forced treatment later.217 One must question whether court-
ordered coercion will ever work for those mentally ill individuals 
who simply refuse treatment.218 Coercion may actually prevent a 
patient from participating in community treatment.219 Studies 
have shown that individuals sometimes avoid treatment due to the 
fear of commitment.220 “Patients are more likely to willingly 
participate in a program when they believe that they are viewed 
as equal partners with the professional staff” as opposed to being 
viewed as individuals in need of treatment.221 The therapeutic 
                                                          
216 See John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond 
Outpatient Commitment, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES, Sept. 2001, at 1198 
(discussing the findings of the Duke and Bellevue outpatient commitment 
studies), available at http://macarthur.virginia.edu/article.pdf; RIDGELY, 
supra note 35. Early studies finding limited positive results suffered from 
significant methodological problems. Id. at xvi. Only two randomized clinical 
trials of involuntary outpatient treatment exist—the Bellevue Pilot Project and 
the Duke mental health study, but these studies had conflicting results. Id. at 
xvii. Both studies suggest that improving the availability and quality of mental 
health services leads to positive outcomes, but differ regarding the effect of 
court mandates. Monahan, supra. 
217 Monahan, supra note 216. 
218 See, e.g., In re Endress, 732 N.Y.S.2d 549, 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2001). Despite the fact that the respondent stated he would refuse to comply 
long-term with any outpatient treatment plan or court order, the court ordered 
AOT anyway. Id. 
219 Wisor, supra note 14, at 172. 
220 MadNation, Replacing Outpatient Commitment Initiatives with 
Strategies that Work to Engage People in Need, at http://www.networksplus. 
net/fhp/madnation/news/kendra/strategiesthatwork.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 
2002). One study found that fifty-five percent of patients reported avoiding 
mental health services because of their prior experiences of being involuntarily 
committed. Id. Another study found that forty-seven percent of patients 
discharged from a hospital stated that the fear of being involuntarily committed 
has caused them to avoid treatment on prior occasions. Monahan, supra note 
216. 
221 Wisor, supra note 14, at 172. See also Monahan, supra note 216 
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relationship is unlikely to develop in a system based on 
compulsion.222 
A 1984 study of North Carolina’s outpatient commitment 
statute found that success did not relate to coercion but rather to 
staff dedication.223 Similar to the Bellevue Pilot Project study, the 
North Carolina study found that those under outpatient 
commitment did not fare significantly better on outcome 
measures of living situation, rehospitalization, number of hospital 
days, social contacts, employment, dangerousness and arrest as 
compared to the control group.224 The study did find, however, 
that those on outpatient commitment had lower rates of 
medication refusal and treatment noncompliance.225 In addition, 
they tended to stay in treatment longer.226 
A more recent study of North Carolina’s outpatient 
commitment statute, conducted by Duke University researchers, 
found no significant differences regarding hospital use between 
those on outpatient commitment and the control group at first 
glance.227 The Duke Study did show, however, that extended 
outpatient commitment—greater than 180 days—with intensive 
outpatient services of three or more visits per month was 
effective in reducing hospital admissions, lengths of stay, arrest 
rates and violence.228 
                                                          
(discussing various studies on coercion and its negative effect on patients). 
222 Wisor, supra note 14. 
223 Id. at 172. 
224 RIDGELY, supra note 35 (detailing studies on the effectiveness of 
outpatient commitment in different states). The authors noted a number of 
limitations of the Duke study: the length of time on outpatient commitment 
was not randomly assigned; an adherence protocol ensured that enforcement 
provisions were applied when applicable; and the study was limited to patients 
discharged from hospitals. Id. at 25. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 23. The 331 participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
two groups—outpatient commitment order or no order. Id. Individuals in both 
groups, however, were assigned a case manager and received outpatient 
treatment. Id. 
228 Id. The average intensity of the outpatient services was seven services 
per month. Id. 
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A study of Tennessee’s outpatient commitment law had a 
somewhat different outcome.229 The researchers found that 
outpatient commitment was ineffective in reducing admission 
rates among revolving door patients, which is often the cited goal 
of preventive commitment.230 Other studies of various forms of 
outpatient commitment in other states suggest a positive effect of 
court orders in reducing hospital rates and length of stays.231 
These studies, though, suffer from small sample size and other 
limitations that restrict the validity and reliability of the studies.232 
The empirical evidence is, thus, at best inconclusive.233 
Even if mandated treatment is effective, the detrimental 
impact on patients’ rights suggests that states should consider 
other equally-effective voluntary methods.234 While court orders 
act as leverage for some individuals, “the best studies suggest 
that the effectiveness of outpatient commitment is linked to the 
provision of intensive services. Whether court orders have any 
effect at all in the absence of intensive treatment is an 
unanswered question.”235 Further research is clearly needed, 
however, in order to fully assess the law’s effectiveness. 
B. Statistical Analysis of Kendra’s Law 
According to the New York State Office of Mental Health 
                                                          
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 22. In the Tennessee study, researchers conducted a 
retrospective review of medical records of seventy-eight individuals 
discharged with an outpatient commitment order compared to a match group 
not under court orders. Id. 
231 Id. at 19-21. 
232 Id. Sample sizes included nineteen in a Massachusetts study, twenty in 
an Ohio study, twenty-six in a New Hampshire study, and forty-two in a D.C. 
study. Id. 
233 See RIDGELY, supra note 35; BAZELON CENTER, POSITION 
STATEMENT ON INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT (documenting further studies 
regarding the effectiveness of outpatient civil commitment), at 
http://www.bazelon.org/opcstud.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2001). 
234 See discussion supra Part III.A (comparing findings on the 
effectiveness of voluntary and involuntary programs). 
235 RIDGELY, supra note 35, at 27. 
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(“OMH”), 7,157 AOT investigations were conducted from 
November 1999 to August 2002.236 Of those cases, 3,166 were 
closed with no action taken.237 For the same period, merely 2,135 
court orders were issued.238 Only 843 renewed orders have been 
issued.239 During the same two and a half years, more than half 
of the AOT petitions in New York City were dismissed.240 The 
high number of dismissals of AOT petitions may be due to the 
need to ration limited mental health services.241 The high number 
of dismissals also suggests that too many individuals are 
inappropriately referred for AOT. Another possible reason for 
dismissal is that courts may be requiring the high level of 
specificity as called for in the statute.242 In either case, Kendra’s 
Law wastes expensive investigative and judicial resources, 
especially if only about one of every four result in an order.243 
                                                          
236 STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215. OMH oversees the state’s mental 
health system, including operating psychiatric centers and regulating and 
certifying various mental health programs operated by local governments and 
non-profit agencies. New York State Office of Mental Health, About OMH, at 
http://www.omh.state.ny.us/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2002). OMH is the state 
agency with oversight of the state’s AOT program. Id. 
237 STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215. 
238 STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215. 
239 Id. The Office of Mental Health does not provide statistics regarding 
compliance with AOT orders. Id. 
240 N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, STATUS REPORTS FOR 
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT—NEW YORK CITY (2001), at 
http://www.omh.state.ny.us/ohmweb/Kendra_web/kstatus_rpts/nyc.htm. 
Specifically, 2,143 out of 4,472 investigations were dismissed. Id. These 
reports, unfortunately, do not state reasons for dismissal of petitions. STATUS 
REPORTS, supra note 215. 
241 Schacher, supra note 113, at 1. 
242 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60. See also In re Sullivan, 710 
N.Y.S.2d 853 (2000) (discussing the specificity needed). 
243 See STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215. OMH, however, believes that 
Kendra’s Law has been effective in meeting its goals. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF 
MENTAL HEALTH, PROGRESS REPORT ON NEW YORK STATE’S PUBLIC 
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (2001) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT], available 
at http://www.omh.state.ny.us. An evaluation of the first three months and the 
first 141 individuals in AOT found that case management increased by 194%, 
housing services increased by 107%, Mentally Ill-Chemically Addicted 
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Another indication of Kendra’s Law’s ineffectiveness is the 
state’s lack of use.244 As of June 2000, forty-five of the sixty-two 
counties in New York had not used Kendra’s Law.245 As of 
September 2002, three years after the law went into effect, 
twenty-one counties have still not issued a single court order.246 
Another twenty-three counties have issued orders in less than five 
cases.247 For example, and not surprisingly, in the two and a half 
years that Kendra’s Law has been in effect, Niagara and 
Onondaga counties combined have only used court orders for two 
people.248 The law cannot be effective if it is not used. Even 
those counties that utilize Kendra’s Law do not obtain court 
orders with any degree of frequency. Erie County, for example, 
has created 168 agreements with patients to undergo outpatient 
treatment voluntarily in lieu of AOT and sought only thirteen 
court orders during the first year the law was in effect.249 When 
the law initially went into effect, New York City estimated that 
                                                          
(MICA) services increased by 79%, medication management services 
increased by 67% and therapy increased by 50%. Id. Additionally, the study 
found that medication compliance increased by 129%, while harmful behavior 
decreased by 26% and homelessness decreased by 100%. Id. at 18. This 
study, however, suffers from small sample size and short-term effects, since it 
was so early after the law went into effect. Additionally it suffers from 
potential bias, since OMH conducted the study and oversees the AOT 
programs. This study, therefore, should be critically examined. 
244 See STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215 (providing monthly updates 
regarding the use of Kendra’s Law across the state). Overall, an 
overwhelming majority of the statewide investigations and court orders 
occurred in New York City, which has taken individuals to court to force an 
AOT order in 1,813 cases out of 7,360 statewide investigations. Id. New York 
City also has a higher ratio of court orders to voluntary treatment agreements 
than anywhere else in the state. Id. 
245 Jaffe, supra note 116. 
246 STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215. 
247 Id. 
248 E. Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, Kendra’s Law Could Help 
Mentally Ill Inmates, BUFFALO NEWS, July 28, 2002, at H5. 
249 Gene Warner, Helping or Hurting?, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 30, 2001, at 
A1. As of September, 2002, Erie County has drafted 222 voluntary 
agreements and only sought court orders in thirty-seven cases. STATUS 
REPORTS, supra note 215. 
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7,000 individuals would be eligible for AOT,250 yet less than 
2,000 court orders have been issued in the city since Kendra’s 
Law’s inception.251 
C. Additional Factors 
Other less coercive methods may be equally effective as AOT 
in accomplishing the stated goals of Kendra’s Law—stopping 
revolving door patients and protecting society from the 
dangerously mentally ill.252 The most successful community 
programs ensure a wide array of services.253 Indeed, OMH 
recently acknowledged the effectiveness of intensive case 
management in reducing inpatient hospital days.254 Additionally, 
the money may be better spent on community resources rather 
than court intervention.255 Lastly, education to increase a patient’s 
understanding of his mental illness is a key factor in successful 
treatment.256 A voluntary community program offering intensive 
case management, psycho-education and respect for the 
individual may be as effective as Kendra’s Law in reducing the 
rates of hospitalization, arrest, homelessness and violence. 
Moreover, many individuals with mental illness feel further 
                                                          
250 Jaffe, supra note 116. 
251 STATUS REPORTS, supra note 215. 
252 See Monahan, supra note 216. 
253 Wisor, supra note 14, at 172. 
254 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 243. Intensive case management (ICM) 
means that a case manager is assigned only a small number of cases in order 
to ensure individuals receive an intensive level of services. According to the 
report, ICM clients had a decline in inpatient days by twenty-three days as 
compared to a control group that had eleven fewer days. Id. at 8. 
255 Moran, supra note 33. To implement the law, the state has allocated 
more funding for community programs and discharge planning. Schacher, 
supra note 113. Although some have praised the New York Legislature for its 
funding of community services at a high level after the passage of Kendra’s 
Law, others have expressed concern about future funding because of the need 
to maintain a high level of spending in order for the law to be successful. 
RIDGELY, supra note 35. 
256 Winick, supra note 146. 
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stigmatized by the AOT proceedings.257 Additionally Kendra’s 
Law fails to consider that an individual’s treating therapist or 
physician is in the best position to determine a client’s treatment 
needs.258 AOT orders also displace individuals who voluntarily 
seek treatment and for whom treatment may be more 
beneficial.259 These non-economic costs of AOT suggest 
voluntary treatment is a better alternative. 
Lastly, Kendra’s Law does not effectively protect society 
from violent, mentally ill individuals.260 Two recent examples 
demonstrate that New York continues to be plagued by 
incidences of violence caused by individuals with mental illness. 
In November 2001, a severely mentally ill man, Jackson Roman, 
pushed a woman in front of a moving subway train.261 Roman 
told investigators he pushed her because he was desperate for 
psychiatric help.262 Although it is unknown whether Roman was 
under an AOT order, either way, the mental health system, 
including Kendra’s Law, failed to serve Roman and to protect 
society.263 If he was under an AOT order, he should have been 
picked up and hospitalized for failure to comply after he left his 
program. If he was not under an AOT order, one must ask how 
                                                          
257 June M. Briese, Treat Mentally Ill with Dignity, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 
2002, at § 5. Many “feel as if they are being treated like criminals in the 
[m]ental [h]ealth [s]ystem when they appear for their court proceedings.” Id. 
258 See Hinds, supra note 14. 
259 McCafferty & Dooley, supra note 15. 
260 See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing the legislative 
findings and purpose of Kendra’s Law). 
261 Jones, supra note 4. In August of 2002, Roman was sentenced to 
twenty-two years for the incident after pleading guilty. Dareh Gregorian, 
Grand Central Subway Pusher Gets 22 Years, N.Y. POST, Aug. 22, 2002; 
Barbara Ross, 22 Years in Subway Push, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 22, 2002. 
See also Editorial, Is Kendra’s Law Enough?, N.Y. POST, Nov. 24, 2001, at 
20 (arguing that Kendra’s Law failed since Jackson Roman was able to do 
what he did). 
262 Sean Gardiner, Psychiatric Motive? Subway Suspect Tells Cops He 
Pushed Woman to Get Mental Help, NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 2001, at A7. A 
police officer recalled taking Roman to a local psychiatric hospital recently for 
an evaluation because of his strange behavior in the subway. Id. 
263 Id. 
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he was overlooked. In March 2002, Peter Troy, who suffers 
from paranoid schizophrenia, shot and killed a priest and 
parishioner in the middle of mass in Long Island.264 His case 
raises even more alarming questions regarding the effectiveness 
of Kendra’s Law because the Nassau County Department of 
Mental Health Commissioner acknowledged that Troy’s AOT 
case simply fell through the cracks.265 Hospital doctors referred 
Troy’s case to the county for AOT.266 Insufficient staffing, large 
caseloads, and the inability to locate Troy forced his case to be 
closed without any investigation or hearing.267 Although the 
Legislature hoped to end these types of violent incidences by 
individuals with mental illness through enactment of Kendra’s 
Law, the continuation of the problem demonstrates its 
ineffectiveness.268 
                                                          
264 Lauren Terrazzano & Roni Rabin, Warnings Unheeded: County was 
Unable to Monitor Violent Patient Because He Could Not Be Found, 
NEWSDAY, Mar. 20, 2002, at A5. Peter Troy was arrested three times since 
2000 for bizarre behavior. Id. The year before the incident, he was 
hospitalized at Bellevue for a month. Id. Bellevue told Nassau County 
Department of Mental Health about Troy. Id. After his discharge, he was 
arrested the same month, again due to bizarre behavior, and taken to a hospital 
on Long Island. Id. See also Kieran Crowley & Andy Geller, How Law Failed 
Slain Priest, N.Y. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at 8; Peter C. Campanelli et al., Job 
Vacancies at Fault, NEWSDAY, Mar. 29, 2002, at A41. “As a psychiatric 
patient with a long, documented history of violence, Troy did not receive the 
services and follow-up that were to be assured by the passage of the well-
funded 1999 legislation, Kendra’s Law, which mandates outpatient treatment 
for people whose histories are similar to Troy’s.” Id. 
265 Terrazzano & Rabin, supra note 264. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text (noting the continuing 
problem of violence by the mentally ill despite Kendra’s Law). Additionally, 
the story of Rosemary Murray suggests the law’s ineffectiveness. Rocco 
Parascandola, Help for Ill Restricted By Standards, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 2002, 
at A28. Murray’s family was shocked when doctors who cared for Murray, a 
paranoid schizophrenic, said she could not be forced into treatment or an 
institution because she was not considered dangerous. Id. At times, Murray 
was a productive member of society, but then she would stop taking 
medication and deteriorate. Id. There was no “catastrophic moment” that 
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CONCLUSION 
As one commentator stated, Kendra’s Law is “neither a boon 
nor a bust,” concluding that “[l]egislators, lawyers, the judiciary, 
and mental heath professionals must continue to analyze the 
effects of Kendra’s Law to determine, ultimately, whether it 
helped to remedy some of the problems it was created to remedy, 
or if it created intractable problems for mentally ill individuals 
and for society.”269 Despite research regarding the lack of 
effectiveness of involuntary outpatient commitment generally, 
New York passed Kendra’s Law as an emotional response to a 
tragedy caused by an individual with mental illness. Although the 
Legislature carefully crafted Kendra’s Law to narrowly define 
those eligible for AOT, it did not go far enough in crafting 
procedural safeguards to protect the rights of those who suffer 
from a mental illness. Given the findings that involuntary 
outpatient commitment has little effect, money may be better 
spent on enhancing mental health services for those who want 
treatment, which would also allow individuals to retain their 
invaluable rights. 
Kendra’s Law automatically expires in 2005, according to the 
sunset provision, unless the legislature acts to renew it.270 Before 
renewing the law, however, the legislature should clarify the 
problematic elements discussed in this note and provide funding 
and resources for further research on the efficacy of the law and 
the treatment programs. Some recommendations for the 
legislature to consider include (1) requiring the treatment plan to 
                                                          
would have led to commitment. Id. Murray’s sister stated she was told “they 
can’t commit her unless she commits a crime, or tries to kill herself or 
somebody else.” It is unclear if the family pursued an AOT order, but Murray 
was recently found dead in a lake in Central Park. Id. Although the events 
leading to Murray’s death are unknown, her mother believes that voices in 
Murray’s head were responsible. Rocco Parascandola, End of a Lifelong 
Battle, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 2002, at A06. Apparently, those same voices had 
caused Murray “to drink water from the curb.” Id.  
269 Susan L. Pollet, Has Kendra’s Law Been a Boon or a Bust?, 
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 2000, at 1. 
270 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney’s 2002). 
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be submitted with the petition, (2) extending the time before the 
hearing, (3) allowing individuals the right to refuse medication 
without consequence, and (4) requiring an independent examiner 
as opposed to allowing the patient’s current treating physician to 
be an examiner. Only a proper balancing of an individual’s 
autonomy and privacy with the state’s interest will provide due 
respect for individuals with mental illness, ensure effective 
treatment, and protect society from those who need more 
intensive treatment. 
 
